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Lecture
ENRICHING DISCOURSE
ON PUBLIC DOMAINS
PAMELA SAMUELSON†
INTRODUCTION
Is there one public domain, or are there many? The scholarly
literature predominantly assumes there is only one, for references
abound to “the public domain” in the singular.1 Yet, even a cursory
review of this literature reveals that scholars sometimes define this
term differently.2 So if there is only one public domain, but many
definitions, perhaps one objective of scholarly discourse about the
public domain should be to seek consensus on the one “true”
definition.

Copyright © 2006 by Pamela Samuelson.
† Richard M. Sherman ‘74 Distinguished Professor of Law and Information, University
of California, Berkeley. I am grateful to James Boyle, David Lange, Arti Rai, and J.H.
Reichman for giving me the opportunity to deliver the Kip and Meredith Frey Lecture at Duke
Law School on March 26, 2005, on which this Lecture is based and for the inspiration their work
has given me over the years. I am also grateful for the insightful comments on an earlier draft
from colleagues who attended the St. Helena Cybercamp, co-sponsored by the Berkman Center
for Internet and Society, and student commentators in the Intellectual Property Workshop at
Boalt Hall.
1. See generally Julie E. Cohen, Copyright, Commodification and Culture: Locating the
Public Domain, in THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF INFORMATION (P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Lucie
Guibault eds., forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 1, on file with the Duke Law Journal); David
Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Autumn 1981);
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and
Meanings of the Public Domain, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 215 (2002); Malla Pollack, The
Democratic Public Domain: Reconnecting the Modern First Amendment and the Original
Progress Clause (a.k.a. the Copyright and Patent Clause), 45 JURIMETRICS J. 23 (2004).
2. See, e.g., James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1, 29–30 (Winter/Spring 2003) (giving examples of varying definitions of public domain).
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Professor James Boyle has provocatively suggested that there are
3
many public domains, and has urged scholars to develop a rich
vocabulary for distinguishing among them. He points out that the
word “property” has multiple meanings, and discourse about
property proceeds without confusion because legal professionals have
learned to discern from the textual context which meaning is
4
intended. Boyle urges intellectual property scholars to develop a
similarly nuanced public domain vocabulary so that it will be possible
to distinguish among its several meanings as well.5
In this Lecture, I consider the potential benefits of accepting the
existence of multiple public domains and ways in which discourse
about public domains might be enriched thereby. This Lecture
represents a divergence from views expressed in my article, “Mapping
the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities,” which I
presented at Duke Law School’s Conference on the Public Domain in
November 2001.6 That article assumed there was one public domain—
the one I mapped—that consisted of information resources free from
7
intellectual property rights. The article acknowledged that other
scholars had defined the term differently, but assumed others were
simply using the term loosely.8 I accommodated other definitions by
9
depicting them as occupying contiguous terrain to the public domain.
I had no doubt that mine was the right definition.
When Professor Boyle endorsed multiple public domains at the
Duke conference, I assumed that he was trying to be a good host to
the scholars he had invited and to discourage us from fighting

3. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 68 (Winter/Spring 2003).
4. See Boyle, supra note 2, at 30 (“The legal scholar will likely use the term ‘property’ in
four or five distinct and well-understood ways, depending on the context: a property interest as
any legally cognizable condition of market advantage; those rights protected by a ‘property rule’
rather than a ‘liability rule’; a variable bundle of rights of interest in things (and a bundle subject
to almost unlimited state regulation and reformulation); any collection of privileges that
includes market alienability, ‘sole, absolute and despotic dominion’ and so on.”).
5. Id. at 30–31; see also Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright
Debates and the Rhetoric of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 87
(Winter/Spring 2003) (arguing for development of “an affirmative discourse that will make [the
public domain] a positive and prominent part of the social and cultural landscape”).
6. Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (Winter/Spring 2003).
7. Id. at 151.
8. Id. at 149 n.14.
9. Id.
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amongst ourselves over the “true” definition of this term. An open
tent approach was more likely to foster stimulating scholarly
10
discourse, and so it did. Yet, I believed then that without a clear and
unambiguous definition of this term, public domain discourse would
be incoherent and efforts to preserve such a domain might be
ineffective because advocates of different public domains would be
11
talking past one another. As I reread the burgeoning public domain
literature, I came to see that there are some advantages, as well as
some risks, to recognizing the existence of more than one public
domain.12 This Lecture represents my reflections on the benefits and
risks of recognizing multiple public domains.
Part I provides a synopsis of thirteen conceptions of the public
domain found in the law-review literature, explaining each, generally
by reviewing its explication by its principal proponent or discoverer.
Part II organizes the thirteen definitions by recognizing that they
cluster around three main foci: (1) the legal status of information
resources; (2) freedoms to use information resources, even if
protected by intellectual property (IP) rights; and (3) accessibility of
information resources. Although it is common to think of information
resources as either IP-protected or public domain, and as either
publicly accessible or not, Part II shows that the public domain
literature views these concepts not as binary opposites, but rather as
points along a continuum. Part III discusses the advantages and
disadvantages of recognizing multiple public domains and
recommends appending adjectives to the term public domain to
clarify discourse about which domain is intended. The constitutional
public domain, for instance, is distinct from the privatizable (although
not yet privatized) public domain. This Part offers reasons why some
conceptions of public domains should be accepted whereas others,
perhaps, should not. The principal advantage of recognizing multiple

10. See generally Symposium, The Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(Winter/Spring 2003) (analyzing the state of the public domain in the digital realm, examining
the constitutionalization of the public domain, and discussing future directions for scholarship
and research).
11. In this concern, I am not alone. See Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts,
and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 114–
15 (Winter/Spring 2003) (emphasizing the importance of clear definitions of terms such as
public domain and commons).
12. See Pamela Samuelson, Challenges of Mapping the Public Domain, in THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN OF INFORMATION, supra note 1 (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (mapping
different conceptions of public domain).
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public domains is that it illuminates a range of important social values
served by these domains and a plethora of strategies for preserving
them and the values they serve.
I. SURVEYING THE MANY PUBLIC DOMAINS
Professor David Lange wrote a seminal article more than twenty
years ago that asked his audience to “recogniz[e] the public
domain.”13 He was a pioneer in doing so.14 The sparseness of legal
commentary on the public domain until very recently is somewhat
surprising given that many judicial opinions had discussed the public
domain as the status of informational works following expiration or
invalidation of intellectual property rights (IPRs) or as the
consequence of a claimant’s failure to satisfy substantive or
procedural requirements for intellectual property protection.15 In the
first decade or so after Lange’s article, the public domain literature
16
grew only modestly. The main catalysts for the recent substantial

13. Lange, supra note 1, at 147.
14. A non-scholarly article predating Lange’s that recognized the public domain was M.
William Krasilovsky, Observations on the Public Domain, 14 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 205
(1967) (arguing that the public domain in cultural affairs was not performing its function of
broadening access to the arts).
15. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989) (“In
essence, the Florida law prohibits the entire public from engaging in a form of reverse
engineering of a product in the public domain.”); Compco Corp. v. Dey-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376
U.S. 234, 237–38 (1964) (noting that state laws may not protect “whatever the federal patent and
copyright laws leave in the public domain”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,
231 (1964) (“[An] unpatentable article, like an article on which the patent has expired, is in the
public domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so.”); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 114 (1938) (“[U]pon the expiration of the . . . patent . . . the name of
the patented article passed into the public domain.”). A rare statutory recognition of the public
domain in the 1909 Copyright Act was a provision that “no copyright shall subsist in the original
text of any work which is in the public domain.” Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 7 (1909) (current
version at 17 U.S.C. § 103 (2000)).
16. For the most notable contribution to the public domain literature in the first decade
after Professor Lange’s article, see Litman, supra note 1. For other contributions to the
literature during this period, see generally L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY F. BIRCH, THE
NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS (1991); Paul J. Heald, Reviving the
Rhetoric of the Public Interest: Choir Directors, Copy Machines, and New Arrangements of
Public Domain Music, 46 DUKE L.J. 241 (1996); Paul J. Heald, Payment Demands for Spurious
Copyrights: Four Causes of Action, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 259 (1994); L. Ray Patterson & Craig
Joyce, Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory
Compilations, 36 UCLA L. REV. 719 (1989); Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright
Law, 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 137 (1993); Pamela Samuelson, Information As Property:
Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in the Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV.
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surge in scholarly interest in the public domain were Duke’s
17
Conference on the Public Domain and the Supreme Court’s decision
to hear Eric Eldred’s constitutional challenge18 to the Sonny Bono
19
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA). International interest in
20
public domain issues has also grown, although for somewhat
different reasons.21
365 (1989); and Diane L. Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some
Thoughts on Marketplaces and the First Amendment, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665 (1992).
17. Symposium, supra note 10.
18. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). Web-based publisher Eric Eldred challenged
the retroactive grant of twenty additional years of exclusive rights for copyrights in existing
works, arguing that the Constitution forbids a grant of exclusive rights without a quid pro quo of
a newly original work to justify it; Eldred also argued that the lengthened copyright terms were
virtually perpetual in violation of the “limited times” provision of the Constitution. See Brief of
Petitioner at 9–11, Eldred, 537 U.S. 186 (No. 01-618), 2002 WL 32135676. Both before and after
the Court’s decision in Eldred, there was an outpouring of scholarship about the constitutional
law of intellectual property, including discussion of the constitutional status of the public
domain. See generally Symposium, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional
Power, and the Constitution, 37 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 1 (2002) (discussing issues involved in the
Eldred litigation and potential ramifications of the decision); Edward Lee, The Public’s
Domain: The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government’s Power to Control Public Access
Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (2003) (noting a rise in the
public’s interest in the public domain because of the Eldred case); Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s
First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057 (2000) (laying out the background of the litigation
and endorsing a balanced approach to copyright protection); Tyler Ochoa, Patent and Copyright
Term Extension and the Constitution: An Historical Perspective, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
19 (2002) (arguing that Congress may extend patent and copyright terms in limited
circumstances); Pamela Samuelson, The Constitutional Law of Intellectual Property After Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 547 (2003) (suggesting that, despite Eldred,
proponents of constitutional limits on copyright extension will succeed in the future); Paul M.
Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and
Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331 (2003) (arguing that the
Court’s deferential approach in Eldred was appropriate); Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, the First
Amendment, and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40 HOUSTON L. REV. 673 (2003) (studying the
effect of Eldred on the treatment of aggressive copyright claims).
19. Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
20. See generally THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION, at viii (Niva Elkin-Koren &
Neil Weinstock Netanel eds., 2002) (exploring the “commercialization, commodification, and
propertization” of information); INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (Keith E. Maskus
& Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (examining ways to preserve information public goods in the
face of the increasing globalization of intellectual property rights); THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF
INFORMATION, supra note 1 (providing international perspectives on ways to preserve the
public domain).
21. Outside the U.S., Eldred had little significance because other nations do not have
limiting constitutional provisions akin to that in Article I, sec. 8, cl. 8 of the U.S. Constitution.
A catalyst for concern about the public domain outside the U.S. was a 1996 proposal for
an international treaty to protect the contents of databases in line with the sui generis right that
the EU adopted that year. See Council Directive 96/9, art. 7, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20 (establishing
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As the public domain literature has proliferated, so have
definitions of the public domain. At least thirteen definitions or
22
conceptions of the public domain are evident in this literature. Thus,

new intellectual property right in contents of databases); see also Stephen M. Maurer, Across
Two Worlds: US and European Models of Database Protection (2001) (manuscript on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (describing differing approaches to database protection in Europe and
the United States); Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT’L L.
369, 419–27 (1997) (discussing a proposed database treaty).
A debate about the public domain that has been more active outside the U.S. than inside
concerns whether to grant legal protection for traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples. See
Brad Sherman & Leanne Wiseman, Toward an Indigenous Public Domain?, in THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN OF INFORMATION, supra note 1 (manuscript at 2, on file with the Duke Law Journal)
(examining the relationship between indigenous intellectual property and the public domain);
Manuela Carneiro de Cunha, The Role of UNESCO in the Defense of Traditional Knowledge,
http://www.folklife.si.edu/resources/Unesco/dacunha.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2006); World
Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Intergovernmental Comm. on Intell. Prop. &
Genetic Resources, Trad. Knowledge & Folklore, Composite Study on the Protection of
Traditional Knowledge, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/5/8 (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.wipo.int/documents/
en/meetings/2003/igc/pdf/grtkf_ic_5_8.pdf; see also Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The
Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1335 (2004) (criticizing public domain
advocates for undervaluing the justice claims of indigenous peoples who want some control over
Western exploitations of traditional knowledge, folklore, and plant genetic resources); infra
notes 148–54 and accompanying text.
22. This Lecture does not differentiate between positive definitions of the public domain,
such as Litman, supra note 1, at 967 (describing the public domain as the source of raw materials
for new creations), and negative definitions, such as Samuels, supra note 16, at 137 (describing
the public domain as what’s left over when all IP-protected information is subtracted). These
conceptions are, in my view, subsets of public domains (PD) 1 and 2 infra. I have also omitted
conceptions of the public domain as lands owned by the government, even though this was the
original American meaning of this term. See Ochoa, supra note 1, at 239 n.154. I do so to focus
attention on informational public domains rather on land. For similar reasons, I do not include
Professor Ann Bartow’s conception of public domain in her forthcoming article on trademarks
and the physical public domain. See Ann Bartow, Trademarks of Privilege: Naming Rights &
The Physical Public Domain (forthcoming) (unpublished manuscript at 9, on file with the Duke
Law Journal) (using public domain to refer to public structures or places that are branded with
corporate trademarks, such as Houston’s Minute Maid Park)
A usage of public domain that is closer to those discussed in this article is that reflected in
the title of an essay written by the current register of copyrights:
When I say copyright has entered the public domain, I mean it is now on trial in the
court of public opinion—the public is making judgments about whether copyright is a
good thing or a bad thing. If they end up concluding that it is a bad thing—that it is an
obstacle rather than an enabler of their access to creative works, then it won’t matter
how right on the law copyright owners are—either the courts or Congress will begin
to reflect that public sentiment, and the copyright owners could soon find that the law
has been changed.
Mary Beth Peters, Copyright Enters the Public Domain, 51 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 701, 709
(2004). Although this usage is distinct from the definitions discussed in this Lecture, it is a
metaphorical usage that was not developed in the essay.
Two other public domains I have conceived, but do not discuss further in this article, are a
quasi public domain and an involuntary public domain. In Challenges of Mapping the Public
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purely as a descriptive matter, Professor Boyle is correct in asserting
that there are many public domains. Each of these definitions or
conceptions is discussed below as a prelude to reflections on whether
the proliferation of definitions or conceptions of the public domain is
a blessing or a curse.
A. Public Domain (PD) 1: Information Artifacts Wholly Free from
Intellectual Property Rights
Professor Boyle’s Second Enclosure article mentions that some
definitions of the public domain focus on information artifacts
unencumbered by intellectual property rights.23 This would include
works in which IP rights have expired or are otherwise inoperative
(e.g., because invalidated in litigation) and publicly disclosed works
that do not qualify for IPRs for one or more reasons (e.g., because of
insufficient originality for a copyright or unknown utility for a

Domain, supra note 12, I discuss several categories of information whose intellectual property
status is somewhat ambiguous, such as International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215, 236 (1918), which held news to be quasi-property as to a competitor, although common
property as to the world, and Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262–63 (1979),
which declared information to be in the public domain as to others, but not as to persons who
contracted to pay for early disclosure and the right to use it. Ambiguous-status information
could be considered as a quasi public domain. I have also imagined defining an involuntary
public domain populated with, among other things, MP3 files of popular sound recordings
traded via peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies and perhaps trade secrets published on the
Internet. See Peter Biddle, Paul England, Marcus Peinado, & Bryan Willman, The Darknet and
the Future of Content Distribution, PROCEEDINGS OF ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS
MANAGEMENT §§ 2.3, 2.4 (2002), http://crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/darknet5.doc (discussing
peer-to-peer file sharing and the likely persistence of “darknet” trading of copyrighted digital
content). Officially, commercial sound recordings are protected by copyright law in the US, but
if they are as widely available as if they were public domain works, one could argue that they
have been committed to an involuntary public domain. However, because neither the quasi
public domain nor the involuntary public domain conception is presently recognized in the
literature, neither is discussed further in this Lecture.
23. Boyle, supra note 3, at 59–60, 68. This public domain is aptly deemed “the opposite of
property,” as the subtitle to Professor Boyle’s Symposium Foreword implies. See Boyle, supra
note 2. Although Boyle does not cite to sources in which the public domain is so defined,
Black’s Law Dictionary is one such source. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1265 (7th ed. 1999)
(“The universe of inventions and creative works that are not protected by intellectual property
rights and are therefore available for anyone to use without charge.”); see also 1 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1:2 (3d ed. 1996)
(defining public domain as “the status of an invention, creative work, commercial symbol, or
any other creation that is not protected by any form of intellectual property”). Notice that the
definition from Black’s reifies this public domain as coextensive with artifacts, whereas
Professor McCarthy’s, although also focused on artifacts (and not ideas, information, etc.),
emphasizes an IP-free legal status as a core part of his definition of public domain.
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24
patent). This can be thought of as the public domain of the
ineligibles and the expireds.
This public domain definition excludes information, ideas,
25
principles, and laws of nature. One might justify this exclusion by
saying that ideas and information, as such, are immaterial, lack clear
26
boundaries, and are incapable of possession except in the mind.
Ideas and information are, moreover, typically embodied in
information artifacts, such as texts or databases, which will either be
in copyright or in an IP-free public domain. Because ideas or
information do not generally have a tangible existence separate from
the artifacts in which they are embodied, it is perhaps an artifice to
conceptualize them as though they did. There may also be a
granularity reason to exclude ideas and information from a public
domain.27 That is, ideas and information may be too small in “grain
28
size” to be IP-protected or public domain works. In any event, a
public domain may fairly be defined as consisting of IP-free
information artifacts.29 Eric Eldred, after all, wanted to put on the
Internet about-to-be-public-domain information artifacts—such as
short stories written in the 1930s, copyrights in which were about to
expire and which would have expired but for the CTEA—rather than
30
raw data or unembodied ideas.

24. For cases expressing this principle, see supra note 15.
25. Professor Boyle raises the question of whether the public domain “consist[s] only of
works that are completely unprotected, say books whose copyright term has lapsed,” or also
includes “aspects of works that are unprotectable, such as ideas or facts.” Boyle, supra note 3, at
59–60.
26. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 5, at 80 (“How could ideas, which have no bounds or marks
or anything that is capable of visible possession, give rise to a common-law right of property?”);
see also Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 163 (1992) (“[R]ecent developments evidence insufficient
attention to the need for sharp lines and boundaries . . . .”).
27. See generally, e.g., Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 575 (2005) (explaining why small-grain-size original works, such as sentences
or titles, should not qualify for copyright protection).
28. Boyle mentions granularity as a factor in analysis of ideas as public domain contents.
Boyle, supra note 2, at 30.
29. One can, however, object to this definition of public domain for reifying an abstraction
and blurring the distinction between legal status of a work and artifacts embodying the work.
30. Complaint, Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (No. CA 99-0065 (JLG)),
aff’d 239 F.3d 849 (D.C. Cir. 2001), aff’d sub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003),
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/cyber/complaint_orig.html.
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B. PD 2: IP-Free Information Resources
The most common definition of an informational public domain
includes—along
with
IP-free
information
artifacts—ideas,
information, concepts, principles, laws of nature, and the like.31 To
distinguish this public domain from that just discussed, I will speak of
it as the public domain of “IP-free information resources.”
Justice Brandeis’s famous dissent in International News Service v.
32
Associated Press contains a classic rationale for denying legal
protection to ideas and information: “The general rule of law is, that
the noblest of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained,
conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary communication to
others, free as the air to common use.”33 The modern Supreme Court
accepts this proposition. In Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation

31. Many scholars include ideas, information, and the like in their definition of public
domain. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1 (manuscript at 19) (“Words, facts, idea, and preexisting
knowledge were public property, common property or publici juris, as were materials published
without satisfaction of copyright formalities or patent eligibility requirements.”); Ochoa, supra
note 1, at 217–21 (“Copyright law does not protect works (or specific elements of works) which
are not original, which consist of familiar or expected clichés, or which are (as a practical
matter) indispensable to the expression of an idea.”); Samuelson, supra note 6, at 151 (mapping
that which is within the public domain, including, among other things, “[i]deas, [c]oncepts, [and
t]heories”); Diane L. Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say? One View of the
Public Domain, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 297, 312–15 (2004) (“[C]opyright law similarly creates
ownership rights only in the author’s expression, leaving the ideas and facts contained in the
work in the public domain.”). Professor Ochoa points out that the public domain is a relatively
recent term for IP-free information artifacts and that the terms common property and public
property were more commonly used to describe the IP-free status of information artifacts in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ochoa, supra note 1, at 232–39. Ochoa attributes to
Judge Learned Hand the conception of ideas as public domain information resources. Id. at 244.
Hand’s frequent use of the term “public domain” (or the minor variant “public demesne”) in his
influential decisions coincides with the rise of the term public domain for IP-free information
resources and the demise of the terms common property and public property. Id. at 243–46.
32. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
33. Id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Similar sentiments were expressed in the mideighteenth century by Lord Camden: “If there be any thing in the world common to all
mankind, science and learning are in their nature publici juris, and they ought to be as free and
general as air or water.” Rose, supra note 5, at 80 (quoting WILLIAM CORBETT, XVII THE
PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND col. 999 (London, R. Bragshaw 1813)). Thomas
Jefferson expressed similar sentiments, which are widely quoted in the public domain literature.
See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 3, at 53 (“If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all
others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an
individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is
divulged, it forces itself into the possession of everyone . . . .” (quoting Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
326, 333–34 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed. 1907))).

02__SAMUELSON.DOC

792

8/21/2006 8:42 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:783

34
for example, the Court reconciled copyright’s
Enterprises,
restrictions on free speech with the First Amendment’s mandate of
free expression by observing that copyright protected only authors’
expression, not their ideas, the latter being freely usable by anyone
without permission and without charge.35 Similarly, in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,36 the Supreme Court
opined that “raw facts [in copyrighted works] may be copied at will,”
saying that “[t]his result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the
means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art.”37
As in Harper & Row, the Court in Feist emphasized that “copyright
assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages
others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a
38
work.” Given the Supreme Court’s endorsement of ideas and
information as part of a public domain, it is not surprising that many
IP scholars define the public domain to include them.

C. PD 3: The Constitutionally Protected Public Domain
The Eldred case generated considerable interest in and
scholarship about the constitutional status of the public domain.39
Even before Eldred, there was general agreement that the Founders
intended to build protections of the public domain (in the sense of IPfree information resources) into the Constitution by providing that
exclusive rights can only be granted to “authors” and “inventors,”
and then only for “limited times.”40 Compilations of data that lack a
modicum of creativity are, if one takes the Supreme Court at its word
34. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
35. Id. at 556–57.
36. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
37. Id. at 350.
38. Id. at 349–50.
39. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 19, at 99 (noting that Eldred has sparked an “intense public
debate” over the public domain); Ochoa, supra note 1, at 255–56 (commenting on the
significance of the Eldred decision to the current state of public domain law); Zimmerman,
supra note 31, at 329–31 (addressing Eldred’s significance in the debate surrounding
constitutional protection of the public domain); see also Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking
Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 173, 201 (Winter/Spring 2003) (declaring Eldred’s importance in “settl[ing] the core
question of the relationship between the Constitution and the line demarcating the boundary
between the public and proprietary domains”).
40. Paul Heald & Suzanne Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual
Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1120; Robert
P. Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 52–53 (2000).
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in Feist, not just unprotected by the Copyright Act of 1976, but
41
unprotectable as a matter of constitutional law. The makers of such
compilations do not qualify as “authors” because their works lack the
creative originality that is a sine qua non of constitutional
authorship.42 In Graham v. John Deere Co.,43 the Supreme Court
spoke of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution as both “a
44
grant of power and a limitation.” The Court indicated that
“[i]nnovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of
useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by
constitutional command must ‘promote the Progress of. . . useful
Arts.’”45 Congress may also “not authorize the issuance of patents
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
46
domain.”
The “limited times” requirement of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8,
means that Congress cannot grant perpetual protection in writings or
47
inventions. The Eldred case considered whether extending the terms
of existing copyrights by another twenty years violated this “limited
times” requirement. The new term of copyright after enactment of
the CTEA48 is, of course, a limited time in a literal sense. But Eldred
argued, among other things, that the new term was virtually
49
perpetual, and hence, conflicted with this limiting principle of the

41. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 109, 119 (1991)
(noting that the Court invoked the Constitution thirteen times in explaining why unoriginal
compilations such as white pages listings in telephone directories are ineligible for copyright
protection). Whether Congress could grant makers of unoriginal compilations exclusive rights to
control the extraction and reuse of the contents of databases, such as that involved in Feist, has
been the subject of scholarly debate. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of
Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights
in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 539–49 (2000) (concluding that Congress lacks the
power to protect unoriginal databases); James Weinstein, The Constitutionality of Database
Protection, 28 U. DAYTON L. REV. 305, 349–50 (2003) (concluding that database protection
would be constitutional).
42. See Feist, 499 U.S. at 351 (“[O]riginality is a constitutionally mandated prerequisite for
copyright protection.”).
43. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
44. Id. at 5.
45. Id. at 6.
46. Id.
47. See Heald & Sherry, supra note 40, at 1120 (arguing that it is “self-evident” that
“limited times” is a constitutional constraint on congressional power).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) (providing authors with protection for their lifetimes plus 70
years).
49. Brief for Petitioners at 17–19, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618),
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/opening-brief.pdf; see
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Constitution. Because Congress had extended copyright terms several
times in the past, the Court decided that historical practice should
50
inform the Court’s conception of Congress’s constitutional power.
Yet, the Court in Eldred recognized that there were constitutional
51
limitations on Congress’s power to protect writings. As in Harper &
Row, the Court suggested that Congress could not, consistent with the
First Amendment, grant copyright owners exclusive rights in ideas or
eliminate the fair use exception.52
Among the broadest conceptions of the constitutionally
protected public domain is that articulated by Professor Diane
53
Zimmerman. Her “mandatory public domain” includes ideas,
information, works as to which copyrights or patents have expired,
and certain government proceedings, laws, regulations, and judicial
opinions.54 What makes this public domain mandatory is that “what
55
goes into [this public domain] must stay there.” Zimmerman
believes that the “baseline presumption” for constitutionally
protected public domain contents is “that its contents can be used
without permission and without charge.”56

also Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/
eldredvashcroft/supct/amici/economists.pdf (“[T]he current copyright term already has nearly
the same present value as an infinite copyright term.”).
50. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 202–05.
51. Id. at 219–20.
52. Id. at 219 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985)).
53. Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 373–75. Among the other scholars who have endorsed a
constitutionally protected public domain are Benkler, supra note 41, at 536–37; Heald & Sherry,
supra note 40, at 1157; Lee, supra note 19, at 102; Pollack, supra note 1, at 28–29. An even
broader conception of the constitutionally protected public domain can be found in the work of
Malla Pollack. See, e.g., Malla Pollack, The Multiple Unconstitutionality of Business Method
Patents: Common Sense, Congressional Consideration, and Constitutional History, 28 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 119–20 (2002).
54. Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 300, 312, 336–42, 371. Professor Zimmerman considers
ideas, information, theories, and scientific principles to be “First Amendment public domain”
materials, characterizing this conclusion as “‘pre-theoretical’ because it is so intertwined with
the possibility of speaking for any purpose that no theory of the First Amendment could be
implemented without it.” Id. at 326. Zimmerman relies on other constitutional provisions as
“requir[ing] that some information affirmatively be given to the public, and to remain available
without restrictions on its subsequent use,” such as publishing the Congressional Record and
public reports of the president. Id. at 340.
55. Id. at 372. Ochoa speaks of the constitutionally protected public domain as
“irrevocable.” Ochoa, supra note 1, at 262–64.
56. Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 370.
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D. PD 4: Privatizable Information Resources
Professor Zimmerman may be right that many information
resources in the public domain must stay there and are
constitutionally protected from privatization,57 but it is a substantial
stretch to say that the whole of the public domain is unprivatizable
and constitutionally protected. Some information resources in the IPfree public domain are susceptible to being privatized, although no
scholar has, until this Lecture, explored the privatizable public
domain or attempted to define it. Yet, if the constitutional public
domain deserves to be recognized and defined, as so many scholars
seem to believe, then a privatizable public domain may also be worth
recognizing.
Among the information resources that were in an IP-free public
domain for many years before they became privatized are business
methods.58 In the past, business methods, like other public domain
information resources, could be copied at will once revealed to the
public. This changed with the Federal Circuit’s decision in State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.59 Business
methods are now patentable in the U.S., and many are now
60
patented. Similarly, the layout of circuits in semiconductor chips was
in an IP-free public domain prior to enactment of the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act of 1984 (SCPA)61 (unless patented, which they
62
rarely were). After SCPA passed, original chip designs were eligible

57. The Supreme Court has rejected two recent attempts to use trademark or unfair
competition law to protect works that were in the public domain owing to expired copyright and
patent rights. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 38 (2003)
(holding that the failure to attribute authorship of a television program whose copyright had
expired when marketing a derivative work could not be enjoined because it was not a
misleading designation of the product’s origin); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays,
Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34–35 (2001) (holding that a functional design disclosed in an expired patent
could not be protected as trade dress).
58. See, e.g., Loew’s Drive-In Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 552 (1st
Cir. 1949) (holding that business methods are unpatentable abstract ideas); Pollack, supra note
53, at 69 (offering several rationales for rejecting business method patents).
59. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see id. at 1375 (holding that business methods are
patentable subject matter).
60. John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Method Patent Myth, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 987, 990–91 (2004).
61. Pub. L. No. 98-620, Tit. III, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 901–914
(2000)).
62. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-781, at 3, as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750, 5752
(explaining why patent law was insufficient to protect chips). See generally Symposium, The
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 and Its Lessons, 70 MINN. L. REV. 263 (1985) (“The
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for the sui generis (of its own kind) form of intellectual property
63
protection created by this law. Boat hulls were similarly public
domain artifacts (unless patented) until Congress in 1998 created
another sui generis form of intellectual property protection to protect
them.64 This legislation may have been unwise, but the newly created
property right has not been challenged on the ground that they are
65
part of a constitutionally protected public domain.
The right of publicity is a common law intellectual property right
that, in essence, allows celebrities to appropriate information
resources, such as their names and likenesses, among other attributes
66
of their personae, from the public domain. Noncelebrities generally
do not having publicity rights because they have not invested time,
money and energy in the creation of a commercially valuable
persona.67 The names and likenesses of ordinary people may be in an
IP-free public domain, although protected by privacy laws against
68
some appropriations. Yet upon becoming celebrities, their names
and likenesses may be and often are propertized. Tiger Woods, for
example, was not born famous; he became so. When he was
unknown, his likeness was in a public domain; yet, when his likeness
Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 . . . reflects the congressional goal of providing
particular protection for the costly and time-consuming process of designing the circuitry of
semiconductor chips.”)
63. 17 U.S.C. § 902(a), 903–904 (2000).
64. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1332. It is questionable whether the boat hull legislation would have
passed the Kastenmeier/Remington test for sui generis legislation. See Robert W. Kastenmeier
& Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or Firm
Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417, 440–41 (1985) (arguing for a test in which “the proponent of a
new interest ought to show that the interest can fit harmoniously within the existing legal
framework[,] . . . [provide] a reasonably clear and satisfactory definition[,] . . . present an honest
analysis of all the costs and benefits of the proposed legislation[,] . . . [and] show on the record
how giving protection to that interest will enrich or enhance the public domain”).
65. There was, however, some discussion in the legislative history of SCPA about whether
Congress had the power to enact that legislation. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 98-781, at 10, as reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5750, 5759. See generally RICHARD H. STERN, SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP
PROTECTION 41–45 (1986) (discussing the constitutionality of the Semiconductor Chip
Protection Act).
66. See generally THOMAS J. MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY
(2005) (defining and discussing the right of publicity).
67. See, e.g., Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527, 530 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding
that the right of publicity is only available to those who have attained celebrity); Martin Luther
King, Jr. Ctr. for Social Change v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982)
(“[P]rivate citizens have the right of privacy, [whereas] public figures have a similar right of
publicity.”).
68. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1890) (holding that
the appropriation of a likeness for advertising purposes violated the right of privacy).
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became commercially valuable, Woods was able to privatize it
69
through right-of-publicity law.
Trademark law resembles right of publicity law in that persons
(or firms) can acquire exclusive rights in names and symbols that
were initially public domain information resources. Descriptive
names, for example, may, after some years of use, come to signify the
origins of goods or products, thereby acquiring secondary meaning
70
that enables them to serve as trademarks. McDonald’s and
International Business Machines are examples of now famous marks
that were once too descriptive to be protected as trademarks.
When Jack Valenti, longtime head of the Motion Picture
Association of America, characterized the public domain as “an
71
orphan,” he meant to convey that in the absence of intellectual
property protection, there would be too little incentive to invest in the
preservation and continued public distribution of culturally significant
information artifacts, such as 1930s motion pictures.72 Professor Julie
Cohen has pointed out that this view conceives of intellectual
property law as a form of cultural stewardship of valuable
information resources, which prevents those 1930s movies from
73
languishing in MGM’s archives. Allowing privatization of what
would otherwise be public domain works through, for example,
extension of copyright terms, in this conception, promotes progress
by fostering continued availability of commercially valuable works.74

69. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 937–38 (6th Cir. 2003) (recognizing
that Woods had publicity rights in his image, but concluding that a painting of him golfing was
protected expression under the First Amendment).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 9, 13–14 (1995).
71. Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearing on
Copyright Term Extension, H.R. 989 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property
of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 53 (1995) (statement of Jack Valenti, President
and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
legacy/447.htm.
72. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae of Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. in
Support of Respondent at 21, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/supct/opp-amici/mpaa.pdf (arguing that
copyright term extension promotes progress of science and useful arts by giving incentives to
invest in film preservation).
73. See Cohen, supra note 1 (manuscript at 23–29) (discussing the cultural stewardship
rationale for copyright term extension).
74. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 473–74 (2003) (“The size of the public domain is in part a positive
function of the extent of copyright protection, since, as a first approximation, the more
extensive copyright protection is, the greater the incentive to create intellectual property—some
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The cultural stewardship concept of public domain information
resources is, as the Eldred litigation made clear, highly contested.
E. PD 5: Broadly Usable Information Resources
Professor Yochai Benkler is the principal expositor of an
expansive view of the public domain as “the range of uses of
information that any person is privileged to make absent
individualized facts that make a particular use by a particular person
75
unprivileged.” Benkler considers brief quotations of a copyrighted
text in a critical book review, time-shift copying of television
programming with a video recording device, and other “easy case”
fair uses to be as clearly within the public domain as Mozart
symphonies.76 The critical distinction for Benkler is between those
information resources that are freely usable and those as to which an
77
owner can exercise exclusive rights.
By this definition, a wide array of information resources
available on the Internet and World Wide Web are public domain
materials. Many sites, including those constructed by individuals to
express their interests, those of public interest organizations such as
the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and repositories of information
artifacts such as the Internet Archive, make large volumes of
information resources publicly accessible. In contrast with the
78
“traditional, absolutist conception of the public domain,” Professor
Benkler’s conception of the public domain encompasses information
resources that, although IP-protected by copyright law, are privileged
or implicitly licensed for common uses, such as downloading for
personal use or linking. Benkler’s definition is intuitively appealing
because it speaks to a commonality among informational freedoms,
though they may be derived from different legal concepts.
Professor Benkler’s conception of the public domain has
resonated with authors outside the IP field who seek to persuade
fraction of which will become a part of the public domain when the copyright expires or . . . is
not renewed.”).
75. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 361–62 (1999). Professor Robert P.
Merges uses the public domain in a similarly broad way in A New Dynamism in the Public
Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 184 (2004).
76. Benkler, supra note 75, at 361–62. Benkler excludes from this definition contested uses
that might ultimately be deemed fair or otherwise privileged after protracted litigation. Id.
77. Id.
78. Boyle, supra note 3, at 61.
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members of the public to support a new and more public-regarding
79
politics of intellectual property. The Internet, in this view, has
“dramatically extended the traditional functions of the public
domain” by providing a communications medium through which
more people than ever before have become authors and publishers of
interesting content.80 “Paleontologists and rare book collectors, fans
of Peggy Lee and anti-globalization activists, cat lovers and Marxist
81
theorists all have their place at the new [public domain] table.” By
taking advantage of the open infrastructure of the Internet,
“remarkable creativity and useful information arise spontaneously,
confounding neoclassical economists who believe that valuable works
simply will not be created without strict property rights and
82
markets.” This public domain is dynamic and expanding as advances
in information technologies extend uses to which information can be
put.83
F. PD 6: Contractually Constructed Information Commons
Some commentators consider open source software and
information artifacts made widely available under Creative Commons
(CC) and similar licenses to be in the public domain.84 The more
sophisticated proponents of this conception of the public domain
recognize that open source software and CC-licensed content are not
public domain in the sense of the first definition in this Lecture.
Authors of open source and Creative Commons works invoke
intellectual property rights as the source of authority for the license
terms under which they make their information artifacts widely

79. See, e.g., DAVID BOLLIER, WHY THE PUBLIC DOMAIN MATTERS: THE ENDANGERED
WELLSPRING OF CREATIVITY, COMMERCE AND DEMOCRACY 5 (2002) (explaining the
importance of the public domain in “everyday activities”); DAVID BOLLIER & TIM WATTS,
SAVING THE INFORMATION COMMONS: A NEW PUBLIC INTEREST AGENDA IN DIGITAL
MEDIA 7 (2002) (noting the rise of information commons that are widely accessible to the
public); NANCY KRANICH, THE INFORMATION COMMONS: A PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 32–35
(2004) (arguing for a broad public domain).
80. BOLLIER, supra note 79, at 2.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 24.
84. See, e.g., id. at 14 (arguing that open source software is fortifying and expanding the
public domain); BOLLIER & WATTS, supra note 79, at 49–52 (describing free and open source
software and Creative-Commons-licensed materials as within the public domain); see also
Merges, supra note 75, at 190–93 (discussing open source as an example of the new dynamism of
the public domain).
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85
available. The right to use and modify open source or free software,
for example, is typically conditioned on the licensee’s agreement to
make source- as well as object-code versions of the program and
derivative works publicly available; developers of derivative software
must also impose the same conditions on any subsequent licensee.86
Open source licenses vary on many terms,87 although the Open
Source Initiative has sought to standardize core terms that should be
88
included before the software is designated as open source. Richard
Stallman, author of the widely used GNU software, has promulgated
the General Public License (GPL) as the standard for distributing
“free” software, including the GNU/Linux operating system.89
Creative Commons builds on the open source concept by
providing creators an easy way to make their works available with
some, rather than all, rights reserved. To achieve this goal, it provides
creators with several license options. Some allow noncommercial, but
not commercial, uses of CC-licensed material; some allow derivative
90
works to be made, whereas others do not. CC-licensed materials in
digital form carry technically encoded instantiations of the licenses so
that computers can discern the usability of CC-licensed content.
Open source, CC, and similar licensed materials are best
understood as contractually constructed information commons.
Because they promote openness and widespread uses, these
information resources are regarded by some commentators to be
functionally similar enough to IP-free public domain materials to be
91
included in the definition of this term. Even those who might

85. See, e.g., Michael Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
275, 282–87 (2003) (explaining the open source model of software licensing).
86. A variety of open source software licenses is available at the Open Source Initiative
(OSI) website, http://www.opensource.org/licenses/apl1.0.php. OSI owns a certification mark
and has established a process for determining which licenses conform to the definition of “open
source.” See The Open Source Definition, http://www.opensource.org/docs/definition.html (last
visited Jan. 14, 2006) (describing the criteria software must meet to be open source).
87. See, e.g., LAWRENCE ROSEN, OPEN SOURCE LICENSING: SOFTWARE FREEDOM AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 69–71 (2005) (describing various types of open source
licenses). The General Public License (GPL) is, for example, more restrictive than many open
source licenses because it does not permit certain kinds of commercialization of derivative
works or intermixing GPL and proprietary software.
88. Open Source Definition, supra note 86.
89. See http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html (explaining the GPL).
90. The license options provided by Creative Commons are available at Choosing a
License, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2006).
91. E.g., Merges, supra note 75, at 186.
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question whether contractually constructed commons should be
included in a definition of public domain would likely agree that such
commons promote public domain values.
Contractually constructed information commons can be much
more complex and highly regulated than open source or CC-licensed
content. An example is the science commons intended to function as
a public domain that Professor Jerome H. Reichman and Dr. Paul F.
Uhlir envision for scientific data.92 Reichman and Uhlir point out that
scientific data, analysis, and results have traditionally been in an IP93
free public domain. Governmental policies have, moreover,
generally promoted broad and open access to IP-free public domain
scientific data in two ways: The government itself collects and
disseminates vast quantities of scientific data in which it claims no
exclusive rights,94 and it also funds research at universities and other
research institutions under grant agreements that encourage data
95
sharing.
The traditional functions of the public domain of science have
been undermined, Professor Reichman and Dr. Uhlir believe, by
“progressive privatization and commercialization of scientific data[]
and . . . the attendant pressures to hoard and trade [data] like other
96
private commodities.” The pressures come in part from new and
stronger forms of legal and technical protections for databases that
“pose the danger of disrupting the normative customs at the
foundation of public science, especially the traditional cooperative
and sharing ethos.”97 Although the U.S. has not enacted an

92. J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A Contractually Reconstructed Research Commons for
Scientific Data in a Highly Protectionist Intellectual Property Environment, 66 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 315, 317–25 (Winter/Spring 2003).
93. Id. at 319–20; see also Pamela Samuelson, Preserving the Positive Functions of the
Public Domain in Science, 2 DATA SCI. J. 192, 196 (2003) (“Whether in Europe or in the United
States, scientists need to work with legislatures considering anti-circumvention legislation to
ensure that it contains appropriate exceptions for scientific research.”).
94. See 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000) (stating that works of the U.S. government are not eligible
for copyright).
95. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 318. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL
DATA AND INFORMATION IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN (2003) (discussing the impact of scientific
and technical data in the public domain on education and research).
96. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 319.
97. Id. at 320, 366–94.
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98
intellectual property regime to protect the contents of databases, the
99
EU has. Reichman and Uhlir believe that the scientific community
cannot afford to assume the U.S. will not do the same in the future. In
any event, expansive interpretations of copyright law, use of access
controls bolstered by anticircumvention regulations, and restrictive
database licensing agreements have limited access to and reuses of
100
hitherto public domain resources, such as scientific data.
In the face of the increasingly protectionist legal and business
environment for databases of scientific significance, Professor
Reichman and Dr. Uhlir propose that scientific research communities
reconstruct the traditional research commons of the public domain by
contractually binding members of relevant research communities to
form a commons by licensing the scientific data they produce to
repositories to preserve open access, rights to extract and reuse data,
sharing of research data and results, and other public domain
101
values. Reichman and Uhlir draw upon the insights of Charlotte
Hess and Professor Elinor Ostrom who observe that creating a
commons may require “[d]evising property regimes that effectively
allow sustainable use of a common-pool resource” which in turn
“requires one set of rules that limits access to the resource system and
another set of rules that limits the amount, timing, and technology
used to withdraw diverse resource units from the resource system.”102
Reichman and Uhlir offer detailed suggestions about how a science
commons might be created and maintained.

G. PD 7: A Status Conferring a Presumptive Right of Creative
Appropriation
Scientists are not the only creative people who rely on public
domain information resources. The public domain literature is replete
with concerns about the ability of follow-on creators to draw upon
preexisting information resources in making new works. More than
two decades ago Professor David Lange worried that expansive
98. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50
VAND. L. REV. 51, 52–58 (1997) (discussing proposed U.S. database protection legislation).
99. Council Directive 96/9, art. 1, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20. For a discussion of the impact of this
directive on the EU database industry, see, for example, Stephen M. Maurer, P. Bernt
Hugenholtz, & Harlan J. Onsrud, Europe’s Database Experiment, 294 SCIENCE Oct. 26, 2001, at
789.
100. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 371–95.
101. Id. at Part IV.
102. Hess & Ostrom, supra note 11, at 121.
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publicity rights would limit the ability of artists to express
103
themselves. Andy Warhol’s portraits of famous people such as
Elizabeth Taylor would, for example, be threatened if the law gave
celebrities exclusive rights to control all depictions of their
likenesses.104 Professor Jessica Litman similarly emphasizes the
“central importance [of the public domain] in promoting the
105
enterprise of authorship.” She criticizes the romantic view of
originality, i.e., the notion that authors conjure up new works from
nothing.106 She conceives of authorship instead as “a combination of
107
absorption, astigmatism, and amnesia.” Because the public domain
provides the raw material from which all creators draw, Litman
believes this domain makes the rest of the IP system work.108
Professor Lange has recently reimagined the public domain in a
more proactive way.109 He no longer thinks of it as something that
110
needs merely to be recognized or defined. Nor is he is content with
conceiving of the public domain as a preserve or sanctuary in which
creation can take place.111 To make the public domain more dynamic
and robust, he now conceives it as “a status that arises from the
exercise of the creative imagination . . . confer[ring] [on authors]
entitlements, privileges and immunities” to appropriate from other
112
works in the course of creating new ones. This status, he says,
should be “independently and affirmatively recognized in law,
sometimes collective in nature and sometimes individual, but

103. See Lange, supra note 1, at 165 (“As access to the public domain is choked, or even
closed off altogether, the public loses too: loses the rich heritage of its culture, the rich presence
of new works derived from that culture, and the rich promise of works to come.”).
104. A recent example of an expansive publicity rights claim against a creative artistic work
is Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 442 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding publicity rights claim
by Rosa Parks against a rap group that used her name in the title of its song and made reference
in the lyrics to moving to the back of the bus).
105. Litman, supra note 1, at 968.
106. See id. at 965 (“Our copyright law is based on the charming notion that authors create
something from nothing . . . .”).
107. Id. at 1011.
108. Id. at 968.
109. David Lange, Reimagining the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 463
(Winter/Spring 2003).
110. Id. at 475.
111. Id. at 474.
112. Id.; cf. Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112
YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2002) (“[T]he constitutional protection of art is best understood through a
principle that I will call the freedom of imagination. Under this freedom, no one can be
penalized for imagining or communicating what he imagines.”).
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113
omnipresent, portable, and defining.” It should not just be an
affirmative defense to charges of copyright infringement, but an
affirmative right of authors to imagine and bring into being new
works, even if they thereby incorporate parts of existing creations.
“Creative appropriation would be presumptively privileged in every
instance, without primary concern either for exploitation adversely
affecting the economic value of an antecedent work or for the
reputation or sensibilities of its author or proprietor . . . .”114 In so
doing, Lange proffered a new public domain for scholarly
consideration.

H. PD 8: A Cultural Landscape
Professor Julie Cohen shares Professor Lange’s concern about
the ability of creators to draw upon existing works in the course of
engaging in creative work. In recent work, she characterizes the
public domain as “a policy construct intended to foster the
development of artistic culture,”115 asserting that “a theory of the
public domain must make sense when measured against the ways that
116
creative practice works.” The proper approach to defining “the
relationship between the proprietary and the public in copyright law
is not to be derived by interrogating nineteenth-century legal
concepts, nor by studying markets for creative products or modeling
information as an autonomous system, but rather by more careful
attention to creativity as a social phenomenon manifested through
creative practice.”117
Professor Cohen aims to locate the public domain in the context
of creative practice, suggesting that it is best understood as an integral
118
part of the cultural landscape in which creative practice occurs. The
public domain “is not a discrete preserve, but rather a distributed
119
property of social space.” Cohen also describes this space as
“everywhere the public is,” and characterizes it as a “cultural

113. Lange, supra note 109, at 474.
114. Id. at 479 (quoting David Lange & Jennifer Lange Anderson, Copyright, Fair Use and
Transformative Critical Appropriation (2001), http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/langeand.pdf
(last visited on Jan. 6, 2006)).
115. Cohen, supra note 1 (manuscript at 19).
116. Id.
117. Id. (manuscript at 52).
118. Id. (manuscript at 4).
119. Id. (manuscript at 41).

02__SAMUELSON.DOC

2006]

8/21/2006 8:42 AM

ENRICHING PUBLIC DOMAINS

805

120

landscape.” Creators should have, Cohen believes, “baseline rights”
to engage in “unplanned, fortuitous access and opportunistic
borrowing” from this cultural landscape.121 The principal policy
prescription that follows from her conception of the public domain
can be succinctly stated: “If we as a society want to facilitate the
development of artistic culture, copyright doctrine should recognize
rights of access to the common in culture to a far greater extent than
it currently does.”122 Copyright doctrine should accordingly be
reformed to narrow the scope of protection that the law now provides
to rights holders against those who reproduce portions of existing
works in the course of preparing their own works, particularly those
who make transformative derivative works.123
I.

PD 9: A Communicative Sphere

Many eloquent musings about the public domain focus on its
124
importance to deliberative democracy. Among the most recent
contributions to this genre is an essay by Professor Michael Birnhack,
in which he asserts that the public domain plays
a crucial role in personal self-development, learning, experiencing,
imagining, speaking with others, creating new works for the benefit
of ourselves and wider circles, starting from the immediate
interlocutor and up to the entire community. The public domain is
the means and the end to “promote the progress of science” (in the
U.S. Constitution’s formulation), or for “the encouragement of
learning” (in the language of the Statute of Anne). It is where
knowledge is created and where it lies awaiting new interpretations,

120. Id. (manuscript at 42).
121. Id.
122. Id. (manuscript at 4).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., BOLLIER, supra note 79, at 1 (“[T]he public domain has always been critical to
new creativity, the progress of science and technology and the vitality of our democratic
culture.”); KRANICH, supra note 79, at 1 (“Building the information commons is essential to 21st
century democracy . . . .”); Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political
Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1262 (2003) (“The industrial model of mass media
communications that dominated the twentieth century suffers from two types of democratic
deficits that could be alleviated by a greater role for commons-based production.”);
Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 310 (“[T]he personal and social values of autonomy and
participation in self governance . . . are supported by access to a large commons . . . .”).
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new applications and new meanings. It is not a graveyard, but a
125
playground for speech-experiments.

The public domain and free speech are important, he thinks, not only
because they foster self-actualization and progress of science, but also
because both
construct, or aim at constructing, a communicative sphere, where
people can interact with each other in various circles, whether it is
an interpersonal circle, a communitarian one or a wider political
circle. In this sense, both the public domain and the idea of freedom
126
of speech stem from the same source.

He thereby elevates the public domain to the same fundamental
human right status as free speech.127
Professor Birnhack explains his conception of the public domain
as a communicative sphere by observing that:
[B]oth copyright law and free speech jurisprudence aim at a rich and
diverse public domain, in which deliberation can take place without
any impediments, in which all who wish can participate, regardless
of their market power. It is a public domain which is interested in
the exchange between the multiple voices and their expressions,
which realizes that new ideas form when old ideas interact. In other
words, this is a public domain that rejects cultural control which is
executed through the use of property rights; it is a public domain
that is required by the best reading we can offer for both copyright
law and for free speech jurisprudence. It is a public domain which
enables new participants to join in, build on the existing work, and
that acknowledges that repetition in a different context changes the
128
meaning of a work, and thus should be considered a new work.

Birnhack’s conception of the public domain resembles Professor
Lange’s and Professor Cohen’s in its concern about the implications
of the public domain for self-actualization and freedom of expression,
but his conception is less focused on individual creators and more on
125. Michael Birnhack, More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain, in THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN OF INFORMATION, supra note 1 (manuscript at 2–3) (citation omitted).
126. Id. (manuscript at 5).
127. Professor Birnhack seems to agree with Professor Zimmerman, supra note 31, about
the constitutional status of the public domain, but like Professor Lange, supra note 109, and
Professor Cohen, supra note 1, his public domain has a more affirmative character. It is not just
a means of protecting an information resource from being privatized, but it provides a right to
engage in public discourse and use information resources in doing so.
128. Birnhack, supra note 123 (manuscript at 34–35).
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the societal infrastructure that more generally supports the lively
discourse that Habermas famously characterized as the public
129
sphere.
J.

PD 10: Publication of Governmental Information

Like Professor Birnhack, Professor Edward Lee is concerned
with the implications of the public domain for deliberative
democracy. Lee’s public domain, however, focuses on the publication
of previously secret governmental information. Lee gives as an
example of this public domain a judicial opinion critical of
government investigations pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence
130
131
Surveillance Act (FISA). Publication of this opinion contributed
the knowledge it contained about government misconduct into a
public domain. Lee’s public domain “helps to establish a legal
restraint against government overreaching by ensuring the public’s
access to materials that are essential for self-governance and a
learned citizenry.”132
Professor Lee is critical of public domain scholarship authored
by intellectual property professors, characterizing it as “shortsighted”
because it is too focused on a public domain of works free from
IPRs.133 Lee points out that the public domain is an important concept
in other areas of law, such as “First Amendment rights of access,
government secrecy agreements, espionage law, laws regulating
classified information and munitions lists, and the Freedom of
Information Act.”134 Collectively, Lee regards the public domain as a
safeguard against excessive government secrecy. “Injecting
information into the public domain is the perfect antidote to
government abuses that are carried out by means of secrecy. The

129. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger
trans., MIT Press 1989) (1962). Although Mary Beth Peters, the U.S. Register of Copyrights,
would surely disagree with much of Professor Birnhack’s analysis, her use of “public domain” in
the title of a recent lecture (Copyright Enters the Public Domain) to indicate growing public
awareness of and debate about copyright, somewhat resembles Birnhack’s conception of the
public domain as a communicative sphere. See supra note 22.
130. Lee, supra note 18, at 94.
131. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F.
Supp. 2d 611 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2002).
132. Lee, supra note 18, at 97.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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135
Lee
public domain counters secrecy with public scrutiny.”
demonstrates that his public domain has historical antecedents
worthy of consideration in the scholarly debate about public domains.

K. PD 11: A Domain of Publicly Accessible Information
Professors Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss, like
Professor Reichman and Dr. Uhlir, are concerned with preserving the
public domain of science.136 In a recent work, they consider whether
the public domain of science has been harmed by the substantial
137
surge in patenting of scientific and other technological innovations.
Some innovations now being patented, they assert, would in the past
have been in an IP-free public domain. Increased patenting might
seem to cause the public domain of science to shrink. Yet, patent law
requires inventors to disclose their innovations and how to make
them in order to qualify for IP rights, and patent disclosures advance
knowledge. “What matters,” Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss suggest, “is
whether the information a second comer needs is available for use” in
a domain that might be called “the domain of accessible
knowledge.”138 If increased patenting enlarges the domain of
accessible knowledge, perhaps the public domain of science is
139
enhanced, not harmed, by the additional patents. Dinwoodie and

135. Id. Lee contends that the public has vested interests in public domain information, id.
at 119, and that “Congress has no power to remove material from the public domain through
the grant of intellectual property rights,” id. at 205. He also argues for a public right of access to
public domain information. Id. at 206–07.
136. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, WTO Dispute Resolution and
the Preservation of the Public Domain of Science Under International Law, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME 861, 863 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) (“Evaluating
a broad range of approaches would allow us to fully probe the provisions of the TRIPS
Agreement to see which are most hospitable to protecting the public domain of science.”).
137. Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Patenting Science: Protecting the
Domain of Accessible Knowledge in THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF INFORMATION, supra note 1
(manuscript at 3, on file with the Duke Law Journal).
138. Id. Other works that consider policies for promoting public access to scientific
knowledge include Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons: The Case of
Scientific Research, in SCIENTIFIC INNOVATION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 145 (Ellen
Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. & Jeffrey Paul, eds., 1996) and Arti Rai & Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
289 (Winter/Spring 2003).
139. See Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 137, at 7 (“[T]he domain of accessible
knowledge benefits from the upswing in issuances. Since the other side of the patent coin is
disclosure, more patents mean more information is revealed in the specifications, with the result
that more information is available for immediate use.”). Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss recognize that
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Dreyfuss are not alone in considering the domain of accessible
140
knowledge as a public domain.
L. PD 12: The Unpublished Public Domain
The public domain conceptions considered thus far have
assumed, even if sometimes implicitly, that the contents of the public
domain are “public” in the sense that they are publicly accessible.
Professor Tony Reese has discovered the existence of a public
141
domain of unpublished works. He has identified three categories of
unpublished works created prior to 1933 that entered an IP-free
public domain on January 1, 2003, as a matter of U.S. copyright law:
(1) private works, such as journals, (2) preparatory works, such as
first drafts of novels, and (3) publicly displayed or performed works,
such as radio broadcasts.142 Although television programs may be
viewed by millions of people, U.S. copyright law does not consider
them to be “published” because copies of them have not been
distributed to the public.143 Reese suggests that “[a]dding to the public
domain works that have been kept private may change the legal
144
regulation of the public domain.” Perhaps even more significant is
if the increase in patenting of scientific innovations is occurring because of inappropriately low
standards of invention, then patents on “trivial variations and marginal improvements
essentially withdraw[] from the public domain information that, effectively, was already there:
either it was described in the literature, or was so easily grasped, the patent system was not
needed to encourage the advance.” Id. at 12.
140. Australian scholars Brad Sherman and Leanne Wiseman also consider the domain of
accessible information as a public domain. They distinguish among: (1) that which is secret, (2)
that which is public domain and unencumbered by intellectual property rights, and (3) that
which is public domain but encumbered by intellectual property rights. Sherman & Wiseman,
supra note 21 (manuscript at 10). Yet, Sherman and Wiseman also use “public domain” to
denote IP-free information artifacts and resources, as in Public Domains Number 1 and 2. Id. at
(manuscript at 1–2).
141. See R. Anthony Reese, The New Unpublished Public Domain 2 (Aug. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (“[T]he nature of the public domain has been
significantly changed, by including for the first time a substantial body of material that is legally
unprotected by copyright but that has never been publicly disclosed.”). This unpublished public
domain might be viewed as a subset of PD 1 (IP-free information artifacts), but it has not
previously been recognized as such. Because Reese claims that this public domain changes the
nature of the public domain, see infra note 145 and accompanying text, it is better to recognize it
as its own public domain.
142. Reese, supra note 141, at 1.
143. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (defining “publication”).
144. Reese, supra note 141, at 1. One reason that legal regulation of the public domain
might change is that possessors of unpublished works may raise state law claims to protect the
works against unauthorized uses, raising as yet unanswered preemption and Supremacy Clause
issues. Reese discusses these issues. Id. at 26–31.
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the change it creates in “the nature of the public domain by . . .
ending copyright’s legal restrictions on works that have not been
145
publicly disclosed.”
Although the legislative history of the law that created this new
public domain is sparse, the unpublished public domain was a
byproduct of abolishing state common law protection for unpublished
works, hitherto conceived as perpetual in duration.146 After the
effective date of this law, original works, whether published or
unpublished, were granted copyright protection for the life of the
author plus fifty years.147 To induce publication of unpublished works,
Congress gave their authors twenty-five years of exclusive rights if the
148
“life plus” term had either expired or nearly so. On January 1, 2003,
that twenty-five-year term expired, and consequently, all unpublished
works created before 1933 entered an unpublished public domain on
that day.149 Each January since then, a new wave of unpublished
works enters this unpublished public domain.
Some possessors of such unpublished works may want to make
150
them widely available without restriction, but others may decide to
exercise personal property rights in artifacts embodying these works
151
to assert legal control over uses that can be made of their contents.
Professor Reese concludes that possessors of such works probably
can contractually restrict access to and uses that can be made of these

145. Id. at 48. Reese points out that
the traditional phrase “public domain” simultaneously reflected two different senses
of the word “public.” The public domain was not “private” in two ways. First, works
in the public domain were not the private property of any individual; they were
instead common and open to the public for use without restriction. Second, works in
the public domain were not private in the sense of being shielded from public view or
held in confidence; instead, virtually every work in the public domain had been made
available to the public.
Id. at 21 (citation omitted).
146. Id. at 3.
147. 17 U.S.C. §. 302(a) (2000). The “plus” term was extended to 70 years by the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b)(1), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827
(1998). Section 302 also provides duration rules for joint works, works for hire, and anonymous
works. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (b)–(c).
148. 17 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2000).
149. Reese says that “[t]his was probably the largest single deposit of material into the
public domain in history.” Reese, supra note 141, at 1.
150. Public libraries and archives may be eager to share unpublished works with the public
because they may perceive their missions to be to promote wide public access to information.
151. Museums, for example, often condition public access to their collections on agreements
not to take pictures or to take pictures only for noncommercial purposes. Reese, supra note 141,
at 29.
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works, notwithstanding the IP-free legal status of the information
152
embodied in them and of the information artifacts themselves.
M. PD 13: The Romantic (or Imperialist) Public Domain
Professor Reese’s is not the only unconventional public domain
in the literature. Critics of Western-style public domain concepts (in
the sense of IP-free information resources) express concern about the
implications of these concepts for indigenous people who want some
153
legal protection for commercially valuable traditional knowledge.
Insofar as traditional knowledge is secret or is disclosed in
confidence, indigenous people can enforce their rights in traditional
knowledge because Western-style intellectual property regimes
protect secrets from misappropriation through trade secret and
breach of confidence laws.154 When Western firms acquire nonsecret
traditional knowledge, however, they feel justified in appropriating
the knowledge without compensating the indigenous communities
from which it comes because they believe it to be in an IP-free public
155
domain. Western public domain concepts are often at odds with
customary norms of indigenous cultures that regulate appropriate and
inappropriate uses of accessible traditional knowledge. The IP-free

152. See id. at 31 (“[A]rchival conditional access contracts may in many instances be quite
practically effective . . . .”). Reese also considers whether Congress should adopt an exclusive
right of first publication to induce publication of unpublished public domain works and
concludes it should not. Id. at 31–48. However, Congress might choose to grant such a right to
conform to a similar right in EU law. See Council Directive 93/98, art. 4, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9
(establishing a term of protection for previously unpublished works first published after
copyright protection has expired). If Congress does decide to grant a new exclusive right to
possessors of unpublished works, Reese believes that the right should be carefully
circumscribed. Reese, supra note 141, at 46–48. He recommends, for instance, that the right not
be automatically granted, but only made available to those who affirmatively register their claim
and deposit copies of the works. Registration, and other limitations Reese proposes, would
reduce transactions costs that would otherwise be imposed by such a new exclusive right. Id. at
46–47.
153. See, e.g., Chander & Sunder, supra note 21, at 1335 (“Native people once stood for the
commons. But in the advent of an awareness of the valuable genetic and knowledge resources
within native communities and lesser developed nations, the advocates for the public domain—
and, in turn, propertization—have flipped.”); Sherman & Wiseman, supra note 21 (manuscript
at 6) (“Many of the problems associated with the general expansion of intellectual property
rights have also been raised in relation to the use of intellectual property rights to protect
Indigenous creations.”).
154. Sherman & Wiseman, supra note 21 (manuscript at 4, 11–12).
155. For examples, see JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 125–28 (1996).
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public domain can seem to members of indigenous cultures and their
156
sympathizers like yet another tool of Western imperialism.
Professors Brad Sherman and Leanne Wiseman, who have
studied Australian aboriginal traditional knowledge policy, observe:
Given the differences that exist between the Indigenous aesthetic
and that which underpins Western intellectual property law, and the
ways in which public domain ideals have been used as tools of
exploitation and colonisation, it is not surprising that Indigenous
groups have been critical of the public domain and the application of
intellectual property to Indigenous creations. . . . If we are to take
Indigenous issues seriously it is clear that we need to reject
proposals that simply attempt to balance private and public
interests. . . . More specifically, it is necessary to reconfigure the
public domain so that it supports and fosters, rather than
undermines, Indigenous interests. That is, it is necessary to create
and recognise the domains established under customary or
indigenous law as new spaces within the legal landscape, rather than
merely applying spatial configurations developed in other contexts
157
to Indigenous creations.

Professors Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder also take
seriously concerns of indigenous cultures about appropriation of
traditional knowledge. They have criticized public domain advocates
for having a romantic view of the public domain. This romantic view
causes these advocates to resist “each and every new claim for
property rights as an encroachment on the public domain,”158 and in

156. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 21, at 1335 (“[F]or centuries the public domain has
been a source for exploiting the labor and bodies of the disempowered—namely, people of
color, the poor, women, and people from the global South.”).
157. Sherman & Wiseman, supra note 21 (manuscript at 13–14) (citations omitted).
Sherman and Wiseman propose to reconcile these tensions by protecting traditional knowledge
through legal rules akin to those that protect geographic designations of origin (e.g., Roquefort
for blue cheese, Sancerre for wine). Id. (manuscript at 17–18). Uses of traditional knowledge
that falsely imply derivation from a particular indigenous culture, for example, could be
regulated without undermining Western-style IP-free public domain concepts. Other scholars
propose protecting traditional knowledge through liability rules. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman &
Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate Local Innovation in Developing Countries:
Application to Traditional Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME, supra note 136, at
337, 338 (“Our thesis is that a properly designed liability rule to protect small-scale innovation
in developing countries would overcome investors’ fears of market failure with fewer social
costs than would accrue either under a regime of unbridled copying or under a regime of hybrid
exclusive property rights . . . .”).
158. Chander & Sunder, supra note 21, at 1335.
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so doing, they “join hands with the corporations to keep traditional
159
knowledge and genetic resource [sic] in the global commons.” This
may “(1) legitimate the current distribution of intellectual property
rights, (2) mask how current constructions of the public domain
disadvantage and subordinate indigenous and other disempowered
groups globally, and (3) impair efforts by disempowered groups to
160
claim themselves as subjects of property . . . .”
Although
sympathetic with the goals of public domain advocates, Chander and
Sunder recommend that these advocates adopt a more nuanced and
cautious stance toward the public domain and recognize the justice of
claims of indigenous peoples as to Western appropriation of
traditional knowledge and plant genetic resources.161 Their romantic
public domain is, thus, a reaction to and pushback against several of
the public domains previously discussed.
II. WHY SO MANY PUBLIC DOMAINS AND
WHAT DO THEY HAVE IN COMMON?
Professor Boyle’s Second Enclosure article recognizes four public
domains.162 Four is a relatively manageable number of public domains
to keep straight. Even Boyle, however, might find it daunting to keep
163
track of thirteen public domains. In the spirit of facilitating nuanced
discourse about the multiplicity of public domains, this Part will
consider why public domains have proliferated and then suggest some
commonalities among them. The commonalities allow some
clustering of public domains to make discourse about and among the
many public domains more manageable.

159. Id. at 1336.
160. Id. at 1335.
161. See id. at 1334 (“We are sympathetic to the project to protect the public domain . . .
[b]ut we are also concerned that the increasingly binary tenor of current intellectual property
debates . . . obscures other important interests, options, critiques, and claims for justice . . . .”).
162. Boyle, supra note 3, at 59–62. They were, in this Lecture’s terminology, PD 1 (IP-free
information artifacts), 2 (IP-free information resources), 5 (broadly usable information
resources), and 6 (contractually constructed commons).
163. For five other public domains that could have been, but were not, discussed in this
Lecture, see supra note 22.
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A. Explanations for Proliferation of Public Domains
Professor Boyle suggests that fear has contributed to the growth
164
in public domains; that is, some definitions reflect what scholars
articulating them fear might happen to undermine a socially valuable
realm of freely usable information resources. There is certainly some
truth in this observation. Professor Lange was initially motivated to
recognize an IP-free public domain because he feared that publicity
and dilution rights were encroaching on a public domain of
information resources that, as a creator, he valued for its availability
for free appropriation.165 Boyle fears a second enclosure movement in
which stronger intellectual property rights, buttressed by such things
as technical protections and restrictive licensing rules, will choke off,
rather than promote, innovation and other socially valuable uses of
information.166 The science commons proposed by Professor
Reichman and Dr. Uhlir is a response to their fears that increasing
167
propertization of scientific work will undermine scientific progress.
Although their concerns run in the opposite direction, Professors
Chander and Sunder similarly seem to have defined their romantic
public domain because of fears that unreflective public domain
advocacy may undermine the distributive justice claims of indigenous
peoples arising from Western exploitations of their cultural
resources.168
Some differences in public domain definitions are, however, due
to different conceptual groundings, purposes that authors have in
putting the definitions forward, and audiences being addressed. If one
grounds one’s conception of a public domain in the U.S. Constitution,
169
as Professors Zimmerman and Birnhack do, the result will be
different than if a public domain is grounded in principles of justice
towards indigenous peoples. Grounding a public domain in positive

164. Boyle, supra note 2, at 29.
165. Lange, supra note 109, at 469–70.
166. See Boyle, supra note 3, at 44 (“More property rights, even though they supposedly
offer greater incentive, do not necessarily make for more and better productions and
innovation—sometimes just the opposite is true.”); see also James Boyle, A Politics of
Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 98–99 (1997) (“The ironic
result is that a regime which lauds and proposes to encourage the great creator, may in that
process actually take away the raw materials which future creators need to produce their little
piece of innovation.”).
167. See supra notes 92–102 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 151–61 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 53–56, 125–28 and accompanying text.
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law will, in contrast, tend to produce a definition focused on the
170
absence of intellectual property rights.
Conceptual groundings, purposes, and audiences are sometimes
interrelated. For instance, Professors Zimmerman and Birnhack
aspire to construct a constitutional fence around their public domains
that Congress and courts cannot breach. Their intended audience is
principally other scholars and courts. If they can convince other
scholars to agree on a constitutional public domain, this may
influence the courts to follow a scholarly consensus favoring
protection of this domain. Professor Benkler and Professor David
Bollier use the term public domain more generally to denote
freedoms to use information resources in an effort to galvanize
popular awareness of free speech values served by the public domain.
Their main purpose is to encourage a new and more public-regarding
politics of intellectual property.
Other conceptions of public domains seem to have been born out
of dissatisfaction with the “traditional, absolutist conception of the
public domain” (that is, information resources unencumbered by
171
intellectual property rights). IP-free definitions of public domain
seem too dull, too tired, too old, too isolated, and too passive to
express the positive values of the public domain that scholars who
have been studying it perceive it to have. When commentators use
public domain and “the commons” interchangeably or use the latter
to signify the former, it may be because “the commons” seems more
interesting, more wired, newer, more communal, and more dynamic
than the IP-free public domain.
Professor Lange’s conception of public domain as a status
presumptively empowering creators to appropriate from the works of
others, for example, is designed to give the public domain a more
dynamic and affirmative character. Professor Cohen articulates a
sociology of the creative process as a way to give vitality to her
conception of a public domain situated as a resource to draw from in
172
a situated cultural landscape. Cohen objects to the term public
domain because it is not, as the term implies, a place separate and

170. See, e.g., Samuels, supra note 16, at 137 (“Is the public domain simply whatever is left
over after various tests of legal protection have been applied? Is it mere ‘background,’ the
‘negative’ of whatever may be protected?”).
171. Boyle, supra note 3, at 61.
172. Cohen, supra note 1 (manuscript at 19–41).
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173
apart from the realm of IP-protected content. Rather, the public
domain is an integral part of the cultural landscape, from which
everyone should be able to draw.
Professor Cohen would probably prefer to coin an alternative
term, for she considers public domain to be metaphorically burdened
by the original American usage that valorizes private appropriation of
the public domain of unsettled lands.174 Yet, because the term has
become a standard metaphor to describe IP-free information
resources, Cohen strives instead to broaden and breathe new life into
this concept. Professor Edward Lee, in contrast, draws upon positive
conceptions of public domain from legal contexts other than IP law,
and suggests that these positive conceptions have resonance for the IP
debate about the public domain.
Finally, public domain concepts may have proliferated in recent
years because “the public domain,” as such, does not really exist. It is
a metaphor, a social-legal construct, that serves “an instrumental
purpose—to assist us in thinking of a complex issue, to organize our
thoughts, to serve as a ‘short cut’ to denote a mindset, a view, a
175
perception” about the legal status of different types of information
and what can be done with this information.

B. Clustering Multiple Public Domains
Though each definition of public domain was separately
articulated in Part I, there is obvious overlap among definitions. The
definitions cluster around three main foci: the legal status of
information resources, freedoms to use information resources, and
the accessibility of information resources.
Legal status definitions consider whether information resources
are or can be encumbered by intellectual property rights. PD 1 (IPfree information artifacts), 2 (IP-free information resources), and 12
(the unpublished public domain) are three examples of this focus. PD
3 (the constitutional or mandatory public domain), in essence, revisits
PD 2 with an eye to carving out what, as a matter of U.S.

173. Id. (manuscript at 4).
174. Id. (manuscript at 52).
175. E-mail from Michael Birnhack, Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Haifa, to
Pamela Samuelson, Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Information Management, University of
California at Berkeley (Oct. 28, 2005) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). See generally
GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980) (discussing how
metaphors shape how humans think about the phenomenon they perceive).
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constitutional law, must be there and stay there. PD 4 (the
privatizable public domain) was born of the recognition that PD 3 is
not coextensive with the public domain of IP-free information
resources. The privatizable public domain needed to be recognized
because PD 2 encompasses more than PD 3, and PD 4 is the realm of
PD 2 that lies outside of PD 3. If Professor Reese, the discoverer of
PD 12, is correct that the unpublished public domain can
constitutionally be privatized,176 the unpublished public domain would
itself be a subset of the privatizable public domain (i.e., PD 4).
Six public domains focus on freedoms to use information
resources even when works embodying these resources are protected
by intellectual property rights. PD 5 (broadly usable information
resources) is the clearest example. This public domain encompasses
the whole of PD 2 (IP-free information resources), but also includes
unregulated, implicitly licensed, unambiguously fair, and otherwise
privileged uses of IP-protected information resources. PD 5 builds on
the insight that ordinary persons do not care if an information
resource is IP-protected as long as they can freely use the resource.
Richard Stallman and Professor Lawrence Lessig invoke
freedom as the principal rationale for creating the contractually
constructed commons of GPL and Creative Commons licenses (PD
6).177 These licenses provide greater freedoms to use information
resources than default IP rules and common proprietary licensing
178
practices generally permit, although GPL and CC-licensed content
are certainly less free than IP-free information resources. These
licenses have been conceived by some as a “partial dedication” of
information resources to the public domain.179
Professors Lange and Cohen seek to promote freedoms for
artists, authors, and other creators. Their public domains (PD 7 and

176.
177.

Reese, supra note 138, at 33–39.
See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY, at xiv (2004) (“[T]he
free culture that I defend in this book is a balance between anarchy and control.”); Richard
Stallman, The GNU Manifesto, Free Software Foundation (FSF) (2005), http://www.gnu.org/
gnu/manifesto.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2006) (“Software sellers want to divide the users and
conquer them . . . . I refuse to break solidarity with other users in this way.”).
178. The GPL, for instance, requires publication of source code and allows modification of
program code, whereas proprietary software is generally distributed without source code and
licenses forbid modification. Free Software Foundation, Licenses, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/
licenses/index_html (last visited Jan. 16, 2006).
179. Merges, supra note 75, at 199 (emphasis omitted).
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8) would, respectively, grant artists a status presumptively entitling
them to appropriate from others’ works and provide a cultural
landscape from which creators would be free to draw whatever
180
inspired them to engage in artistic self-expression. Although Cohen
and Lange express their visions of public domain quite differently,
there is a deep similarity in their visions.
Professor Birnhack’s communicative sphere public domain (PD
9) imagines freedom to engage and be engaged with information
resources as a core constitutional principle. This sphere would, I
believe, encompass the Cohen and Lange artistic creation public
domains, as well as Professor Benkler’s public domain of broad
uses.181 Birnhack’s communicative sphere conception would probably
also encompass Professor Lee’s public domain of publicly disclosed
government information (PD 10) which, at its core, is also a public
domain concerned with freedom to use information to promote
democratic discourse and governance.182
A key distinguishing feature of Professor Lee’s public domain
(PD 10) is the attention he gives to the importance of accessibility of
183
When a journalist obtains a copy of a secret
information.
government document that, say, casts doubt on the veracity of
statements of government officials, and disseminates information
from that document to the public in a newspaper, the journalist
dedicates that information to a public domain that will fuel
democratic discourse.184 The legal status of the document and
information embedded in it will depend not on intellectual property
laws, but on laws such as those that protect classified information and
other government secrets from disclosure.185 The journalist may face
legal liability for disclosing information of concern to the government,

180. See supra notes 103–23 and accompanying text.
181. Professors Chander and Sunder’s romantic public domain (PD 13) is the most difficult
to fit into the clusters discussed in this Section. In a sense, these scholars are concerned with
freedom too, albeit in a different way than those whose public domains are defined in terms of
freedoms that they do or should provide to creators or members of the general public. Chander
and Sunder are concerned that these public domain advocates may make this domain too free
for commercial appropriation by Western firms.
182. Birnhack does not, however, mention Lee’s public domain.
183. See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
184. See Lee, supra note 19, at 136–37 (“[T]he concept of the public domain helps to
establish a lethal restraint against government overreaching by ensuring the public’s access to
materials that are essential for self-governance and a learned citizenry.”).
185. U.S. government works are ineligible for copyright protection in the U.S. under 17
U.S.C. § 105 (2000).
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but the information itself, once published, is irretrievably part of a
186
public domain of information resources such as PD 2.
Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss also emphasize the
accessibility of information, although their concern is with the
accessibility of scientific information instead of government
187
information. Their public domain (PD 11) is a zone in which
information may be encumbered by intellectual property rights, but is
disclosed to the public as a condition of obtaining these rights.
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss point out that if researchers cannot obtain
intellectual property rights on research results, they may well keep
the results secret. Patenting may disclose important details about the
discovery, how it differs from the prior art, and how to make it. This
information will immediately enter the IP-free PD 2, although certain
uses of the information will need to be licensed until the patent
expires. If society has to choose between public accessibility through
patents and inaccessibility without patents, the former would be the
more prudent choice because accessible information is more likely to
advance the state of knowledge in fields of science than inaccessible
information.
Professor Reese’s unpublished public domain (PD 12) focuses on
the legal status of unpublished works created before the mid-1930s,
but accessibility is very much at the heart of Reese’s concerns about
188
Hence, his public domain also belongs in the
this domain.
accessibility cluster. Reese implicitly asks what it means for an
information artifact to be in a copyright-free public domain if it is not
publicly accessible. If possessors of information artifacts have
personal property rights that include the right to control all access to
and uses of the information artifact and any information it may
contain, the public does not really derive any benefit from the
existence of an unpublished public domain. Physical control over the
artifact embodying IP-free information may, if Reese is right, convey
189
more power to control uses than IP laws would provide.

186. See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 136–40 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 141–52 and accompanying text.
189. See Reese, supra note 141, at 24–25 (“While copyright might permit anyone to make
and distribute copies of an old unpublished work, no one can engage in those activities without
having access to the work . . . .”).
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C. Lessons Learned
Several lessons emerge from clustering these public domains.
First, although the legal status of information resources and public
accessibility are, in a sense, orthogonal dimensions, the most robust
public domains are those which are free (or relatively so) of IP
encumbrances while at the same time being broadly accessible to
members of the public. Figure 1 depicts a matrix that clusters public
domains by legal status and accessibility.190
Figure 1. IP Status and Accessibility Matrix
Encumbered by IPRs?
Publicly
Accessible?

Yes

No

Yes

PD 5, 6, 9, 11
PD 1, 2, 3, 4, 10
(broad use; contractual
(4 kinds of IP-free PD +
commons; communal sphere; disclosed government
zone of accessible
information)
information)

No

Not in the public domain
(e.g., private letters in
copyright)

PD 12
(unpublished public domain)

From the standpoint of public domain advocates, the optimal sector
for information resources is the sector that is both unencumbered by
IPR constraints and publicly accessible (the upper-right quadrant).
These information resources are freely reusable for all purposes. The
second-best quadrant is the upper-left quadrant, where information
resources are encumbered by IPRs, but accessible and broadly usable
for many, although not all, purposes. The quadrant of inaccessible
information unencumbered by IPRs may provide some public benefit
as compared with the quadrant of inaccessible encumbered
information insofar as the IP-free legal status removes an impediment
to publication for possessors of some such information.
A second lesson is that although it may be common to conceive
of information as either being in an IP-free public domain or
encumbered by IP rights, the public domain literature reveals a

190. Some public domain concepts, such as Professor Cohen’s cultural landscape and
Professors Chander and Sunder’s romantic public domain, cannot be depicted in this matrix, but
most can be.
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continuum of legal states in between those endpoints. Figure 2 depicts
this spectrum:
Figure 2. Legal-Status Spectrum
Most Restrictive
IPRs+
K+
TPM

IPRs+
IPRs
GPL/
CC
K
(but fair use) open license
source

Least Restrictive
Implicit
license
(WWW)

IP-free Constitutional
public public domain
domain

The left end of the spectrum in Figure 2 shows that intellectual
property rights are not the most restrictive form of information
regulation. Licenses (represented as K for contract) may limit uses
that would otherwise be unregulated or privileged by IP laws.191
Technical protection measures (TPM) may further restrict uses and
192
be backed up legally by anticircumvention rules. Because this triple
protection may be more restrictive than IPRs alone, the triple
protection seems to belong at the far end of the legal-status spectrum.
IPR-protected works are more public domain friendly than works
that are protected by contract and technology, as well as IPRs,
because of the unprotectability of ideas and information, fair use, and
other privileged and unregulated uses.
The GPL and open source licenses allow a far broader range of
uses than most proprietary software licenses, yet they are, as
compared with wholly free IP-information resources, much more
193
restrictive. Because CC licenses contain fewer constraints, on

191. See, e.g., David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract Into Expand, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 17, 23 (1999) (“[The delicate] balance [of copyright law] is disrupted when state [contract]
law is permitted to enlarge the rights of copyright proprietors at the expense of copyright
users.”).
192. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000) (“No person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”). See Symposium,
The Law & Technology of Digital Rights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487, 487 (2003)
(“The idea of building copy restrictions into software and hardware has emerged as a common
response to . . . unauthorized copying . . . . What has varied is the extent to which changes in the
law, sometimes as drastic as technological mandates, prescribed and protected such
technological controls.”).
193. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Exploring Creative Commons: A Skeptical View of a
Worthy Pursuit, in THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OF INFORMATION, supra note 1, at 3.
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average, than GPL or open source licenses, Figure 2 places CC
license toward the less restricted end of the spectrum. Of course,
some CC licenses are more restrictive than others (e.g., some allow
noncommercial uses but not derivative works, whereas others permit
194
the making of derivatives). Thus, CC licenses are not really a single
point on the legal status spectrum, but rather are themselves a
minispectrum of license options.
Less restrictive than CC-licensed content is information posted
on open sites on the World Wide Web that is, at least implicitly,
licensed for most uses. Even at the IP-free end of the spectrum, the
legal status of an information resource may still be differentiated.
Some information resources are more likely than others to be
constitutionally protected from privatization.
Public domain scholars draw the line for their public domain
somewhere on this spectrum between the triply encumbered
information resources and the constitutional public domain. For
many scholars, the public domain is at the IP-free endpoint(s) of the
195
spectrum, whereas for others, the public domain lies more in the
middle of the spectrum.196
Accessibility, too, is not a bipolar concept, but a relative concept
that can also be depicted as a spectrum ranging between the
endpoints of complete public accessibility and complete
inaccessibility. Figure 3 shows this spectrum.
Figure 3. Accessibility Spectrum
Complete inaccessibility
Buried
Secret
(none can (few can
see)
see)

Archived
with
restricted
access
(or secret
licensed)

Complete accessibility
Publicly
In public
displayed record, but
but not
difficult to
“published”
access

Publicly
accessible
if register

Publicly
accessible
without
restriction

194. Creative Commons, Choosing a License, http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/
(last visited Jan. 4, 2006).
195. See, e.g., Ochoa, supra note 1, at 217–22 (discussing what is unprotected by IP and thus
in the public domain); Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 297 (“In the standard lexicon of
intellectual property law, communicative matter is divided into two parts: that which is
controlled by a private ‘owner’ and that which resides in the public domain . . . .”).
196. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 75, at 362 (assuming that the public domain is a range);
Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 324–25 (advocating construction of a public domain
outside of IP law through the use of contract law).
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The most inaccessible information is that which has been destroyed or
buried without anyone presently knowing of its existence (although
buried information is occasionally uncovered). Next most inaccessible
is an information resource stored in a vault or otherwise maintained
as a closely guarded secret. Many secrets are, of course, licensed or
otherwise distributed to one or more persons subject to implicit or
explicit confidentiality restrictions.197 Licenses vary in restrictiveness
regarding who may access and use the information and for what
purposes. Licensed information is, thus, a minispectrum within the
larger accessibility spectrum, not just one point on the spectrum.
Licensed information may be part of the unpublished public
domain, but this latter domain also includes much content, such as
television and radio programming and paintings mounted on the walls
of public museums.198 Because publicly displayed information is much
more accessible than licensed secrets or information kept in vaults, it
is depicted in Figure 3 as lying toward the more accessible end of the
spectrum. A considerable amount of information is publicly
accessible (e.g., court records) if one is willing to take time and effort
to discover it, but is, pragmatically speaking, not as accessible as
information available online for which one registers to get access
(e.g., the online version of the New York Times). Figure 3
accommodates these insights by putting such information near, but
not overlapping with, information that is publicly accessible without
restriction on this spectrum. The public/private distinction, as applied
to accessibility of information, is thus more nuanced and complicated
than common discourse about it might suggest.
III. BENEFITS AND RISKS OF
ACCEPTING MULTIPLE PUBLIC DOMAINS
Accepting the existence of multiple public domains offers several
benefits. For one thing, it avoids unnecessary and likely fruitless
disputes over which definition of the public domain is the “true” or
“correct” one.199 A second benefit is broadened awareness about
197. See, e.g., JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRET LAW § 9.04[2] (1997) (reviewing the
increasingly common employee confidentiality agreement).
198. Reese, supra note 141, at 12.
199. Accepting multiple public domains also avoids wasteful expenditures of time and
energy by scholars in reconsidering and recasting previous analyses of public domain issues to
take into account a later-arising consensus definition (assuming consensus could be achieved).
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public domains and public domain values. When scholars, such as
Professors Benkler, Birnhack, Boyle, and Lessig, speak about a wide
range of free uses of information resources as a public domain that
members of the public should be able to enjoy, they speak in a
language accessible to the public, appealing to shared values of the
American free speech culture. An intellectual property professional,
although willing to agree that certain uses of information resources
are beyond copyright owner control, might offer pedantic
explanations for this conclusion.200 Members of the public are likely to
201
tune out to such explanations because they lack moral force.
A third benefit of accepting multiple public domains is that
context-sensitive uses can develop. One differentiator may be who is
speaking. When Professor Benkler speaks of a public domain, he will
mean a broader realm of information resources than Professor
202
Zimmerman, for example. Another differentiator may be the
affected communities. The public domain concerns and needs of
artistic communities may, for example, be different from the concerns
and needs of scientific communities. Artists need freedom to engage

Moreover, even if scholars were willing to retract their previous definitions to accommodate
consensus on a different public domain definition, their prior work utilizing the old definition
would still be in the literature and could still influence the views of subsequent scholars ignorant
of the retraction. So at least in the short, and possibly medium, term, a consensus definition
seems neither feasible nor likely to dispel future confusion.
200. A copyright lawyer might explain, for example, that it is permissible to copy ideas or
information from a copyrighted work because section 102(b) of the Copyright Act of 1976
excludes them from the scope of copyright protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (listing
various elements of works that are not within the scope of copyright protection). It is also
permissible to parody a copyrighted work under copyright law’s fair use doctrine, Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994), although not necessarily to satirize it, id. at
580–81. An IP pedant would be clear that fair use and public domain are very different, both
conceptually and legally.
An IP pedant might go on to say that of course no one has a “right” to engage in parody,
for fair use is merely an affirmative defense to a claim of infringement. Whether fair use is a
defense or a right is the subject of much debate. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE INFORMATION AGE 133 & n.20
(2000) (noting the existence of a controversy over the “defense” and “right” conceptions of fair
use).
201. Copyright professionals may wonder why the public doesn’t respect and abide by
copyright law as much and as well as copyright owners think it should. Perhaps copyright
professionals should reflect upon the arcane and nit-picking language that copyright law and its
statutory categorization provides them. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 29, 181
(2001) (expressing concern about the incomprehensibility of copyright law).
202. Compare supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text (reflecting a “range” conception of
the public domain), with supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (reflecting an all-or-nothing
conception of the public domain).
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in artistic self-expression, whereas scientists need open access to and
unconstrained reuse of scientific data, methods, analyses, and
203
results. A third differentiator may be the kind of information
resource about which one is speaking. Some public domain resources,
such as ideas, are more likely to qualify as constitutionally protected
public domain information resources than, say, boat hulls or typeface
204
designs. Distinguishing the constitutionally protected public domain
from the privatizable public domain may clarify debate and analysis.
A fourth benefit of accepting multiple conceptions of the public
domain is that it enables more nuanced answers to some questions
posed in the literature. Is the public domain shrinking, as some
205
commentators fear? If one views the public domain, as Professor
Lange once did, as a kind of zero sum game, every expansion of IPRs
concomitantly shrinks the public domain.206 If one accepts ideas and
207
information as public domain resources, then publication of new
copyrighted works will concomitantly expand the public domain and
the copyright domain, for the ideas and information in these works
will be dedicated to an IP-free public domain upon publication.208

203. Compare Cohen, supra note 1, at 58 (“If one asks where the common in artistic culture
may be found, the answer, quite simply, is that it is everywhere the public is, and that
unplanned, fortuitous access and opportunistic borrowing are matters of the utmost
importance.”), with Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 317 (“Factual data are fundamental to
the progress of science and to our pre-eminent system of innovation.”).
204. See supra notes 39–56 and accompanying text (discussing a constitutional public
domain); see also supra notes 57–74 and accompanying text (discussing a not-yet-privatized
public domain).
205. Professor Lange once analogized the public domain to the decline of buffalo herds on
the Western plains, supra note 1, at 178, although he later regretted this metaphor, supra note
109, at 468. For a recent work using this metaphor, see, for example, Cecil C. Kuhne III, The
Steadily Shrinking Public Domain: Inefficiencies of Existing Copyright Law in the Modern
Technology Age, 50 LOY. L. REV. 549 (2004); see also Duke Law School, Conference on the
Public Domain: Schedule, http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/schedule.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2006)
(describing a Saturday morning panel discussion on challenges to science posed by a shrinking
public domain); Posting of Ann Okerson to http://www.library.yale.edu/~llicense/ListArchives/
0208/msg00074.html (Aug. 20, 2002, 08:11 EST) (disseminating an invitation to a workshop on
the shrinking public domain).
206. See Lange, supra note 1, at 171 (“[T]he very momentum of these expanding claims
tends to blur, and then displace, important individual and collective rights in the public
domain.”); id. at 175–76 (“[T]he public domain in the field of intellectual property today can be
compared to the public grazing lands on the Western plains of a century ago.”).
207. See supra notes 30–37 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880) (“The copyright of a work on
mathematical science cannot give to the author an exclusive right to the methods of operation
which he propounds . . . .”).
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Similarly, if one asks whether the public domain is the same as
the commons, the answer will depend on the context in which the
terms are used. Professor Litman used public domain and commons
interchangeably to signify that certain information resources can be
used without IP or other restrictions and hence are common
resources to all for all purposes.209 But neither Professor Litman nor
other public domain scholars would be confused when Professor
Reichman and Dr. Uhlir use the term “commons” in relation to
scientific databases.210 Public domain scholars would also accept that
the science commons would require elaborate institutional regulation
of IPR-protected information resources in order to promote public
domain values.211
A fifth, and probably the most significant, benefit of accepting
multiple public domains is that one gains deeper insights about public
domain values by looking at public domains from different
perspectives. Distilling insights from the broad-ranging public domain
scholarship, one can discern that the public domain serves many
positive functions for society: as a building block for the creation of
new knowledge,212 and as an enabler of competitive imitation,213
follow-on creation,214 free or low cost access to information,215 public

209. Litman, supra note 1, at 975 (“In the intellectual property context, the term [public
domain] describes a true commons comprising elements of intellectual property that are
ineligible for private ownership. The contents of the public domain may be mined by any
member of the public.” (footnotes omitted)).
210. E.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 462 .
211. See, e.g., id. at 326–29 (reviewing the key role of the United States government in
maintaining the research commons). The “commons” of Creative Commons is distinguishable
from Professor Litman’s and Professor Reichman and Dr. Uhlir’s commons because this
organization provides a legal infrastructure for enabling individual creators to make their works
available for broad usages, while allowing them to retain control over some uses of their works.
See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
212. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 317 (“Factual data are fundamental to
the progress of science and to our preeminent system of innovation.”).
213. See, e.g., Ochoa, supra note 1, at 215 (“We take it for granted that the plays of
Shakespeare and the symphonies of Beethoven are in the public domain and may be freely
copied, adapted, and performed by anyone.”).
214. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 1, at 966 (“But the very act of authorship in any medium is
more akin to translation and recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of
the sea.”).
215. See, e.g., Molly S. Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright Law, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1535, 1575 (2005) (“Where the second-generation creator just needs to reuse an abstract
idea, or a generally-catchy tune, she can probably find what she needs in the public
domain . . . .”).
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216
education,217 self-expression and
access to cultural heritage,
218
autonomy,
various governmental functions,219 or deliberative
democracy.220 This recognition, in turn, may foster interdisciplinary
work to extend understanding of public domains and the values they
serve.
Public domain scholarship has also offered an array of inspiring
221
ideas about how and why to preserve and protect public domains.
Some scholars direct attention to legislative proposals (e.g., advising
legislators not to enact new legal norms that encroach on the public
domain, such as EU-style database legislation).222 Some offer legal
arguments for preserving public domain information resources in
anticipation of litigation in which the public domain status of those
resources might be tested (e.g., by setting forth a constitutional

216. See, e.g., quotation cited supra note 213.
217. See, e.g., BOLLIER, supra note 79, at 2 (noting that the public domain “enable[s] all
sorts of endeavors,” including education); cf. Ochoa, supra note 1, at 215 (“Students and
scholars debate historical events, ranging from the origins of man to the impeachment of
President Clinton.”).
218. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 1 (manuscript at 3) (discussing the argument of some
scholars that “the extension of copyright protection to a variety of materials . . . amount[s] to
improper appropriation of the public domain building blocks of knowledge and creative
expression”).
219. See, e.g., Patterson & Joyce, supra note 16, at 756 (“Indeed, history demonstrates that
even individuals who own copyrights on governmental works can perform a censorship function
for the government . . . .”).
220. See, e.g., supra note 125 and accompanying text; Lee, supra note 19, at 97 (“[T]he
concept of the public domain helps to establish a legal restraint against government
overreaching by ensuring the public’s access to materials that are essential for self-governance
and a learned citizenry.”); Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 332 (“To be sure, some progenitors of
the First Amendment may have understood the necessity for a public domain to effectuate their
vision of protection for public discourse . . . .”).
221. Although the literature mainly offers positive perspectives about public domains, a
number of public domain scholars have pointed out that Western-style public domain concepts
have sometimes had baleful consequences for indigenous people whose folklore, sacred art, and
shamanic knowledge have been appropriated without compensation. See supra note 21. And if
one takes seriously the time, money and energy that may be required to provide sustainable
access to public domain information resources, one can come to appreciate that IP incentives
may be needed to justify investments in sustainable access. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra
note 74, at 488–95 (arguing for IP protection in otherwise public domain works to encourage
investment in their preservation and distribution). But see generally Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante
vs. Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004) (questioning
Landes and Posner’s analysis and conclusions).
222. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 336 (noting that one of the legal rules still
supporting the fragile data-sharing ethos in science is the fact that the U.S. has not made data
sets protectable IP assets, as has the E.U.); Samuelson, supra note 6, at 159 (warning that an EU
style database law would “pose [a] substantial threat[] to the digital public domain”).
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grounding for information resources that some firms may want to
223
privatize). Some suggest that the public has an affirmative right to
the contents of the public domain.224 Some offer suggestions for
proactive measures to promote public domain values by private
individuals, communities, or institutions (e.g., Creative Commons
licenses or the contractually reconstructed commons for scientific
225
data). Some suggest making it easier to dedicate information
resources to the public domain (e.g., by standardizing disclaimers or
waivers of IPRs).226 Some offer support for governmental agency
actions or policies that promote public domain access to data or
knowledge (e.g., National Institutes of Health guidelines for data
sharing).227
Professor Robert Merges points out that many private actors are
investing in the creation of public domain information resources as
essential inputs to the creation and dissemination of complementary
products or services from which they will be able to recoup research
and development investments.228 Open source software, CC-licensed
music, and open-access databases are examples of “a private-ordering
229
response to the phenomenon of the ‘anticommons’” —that is, to a
phenomenon in which a proliferation of property rights inhibits
investment in innovation because there are too many rights to be
cleared.230 Merges provocatively suggests that the public domain has
become more valuable and dynamic in reaction to the strengthening
231
of intellectual property rights.

223. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 31, at 371 (positing a constitutionally grounded public
domain from which information cannot be removed once it has entered).
224. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 19, at 209 (“Whatever lies in the public’s domain belongs, by
definition, to the people and is, therefore, off-limits to government control.”).
225. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 371–95 (arguing for a contractually
created commons).
226. Merges, supra note 75, at 185, 201.
227. See, e.g., Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 138, at 308–09 (noting that the National Institutes
of Health (NIH) has successfully used its power of persuasion to keep scientific norms of data
sharing alive, but expressing fear that the NIH will soon need additional legal authority).
228. Merges, supra note 75, at 183–84.
229. Id. at 186; see also id. at 186–98 (reviewing several examples of these “PropertyPreempting Investments”). Merges speaks of CC licenses as partial dedications to the public
domain. Id. at 199.
230. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation?
The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998) (“[A] resource is prone
to underuse in a ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ where multiple owners each have a right to
exclude others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use.”).
231. Merges, supra note 75, at 184–86.
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Professors Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss make a significant
contribution to public domain scholarship by emphasizing the
importance of accessibility of information resources as a means of
232
promoting the ongoing progress of science and useful arts.
Innovators who have a choice between trade secrecy and patent
protection for, say, a chemical discovery will thereby be making a
choice between inaccessible and accessible information. Subsequent
researchers may rediscover the same compound or process, and
competitors may eventually reverse engineer the secret, but the
issuance of a patent will disclose what that innovation is, how to make
it, how it differs from the prior art, what its known or likely utility is,
and in the U.S., the best mode of making it. This knowledge will
thereby become publicly accessible sooner and with less reduplication
of effort than the trade secret option would produce. Upon
publication, the information that the patent provides will be in the
public domain, although certain uses of it will be proscribed during
the effective life of the patent. Upon expiration, the right to practice
the claimed invention will be an IP-free public domain as well.233
The absence-of-IPR definition of public domain tends to ignore
that some public domain works may become more publicly accessible
through proprietary access control and licensing restrictions than if
they were in a completely IP-free zone. Lexis and Westlaw, for
example, provide access to state and federal statutes, regulations, and
judicial opinions, all of which are officially IP-free as a matter of U.S.
law.234 Such legal information is widely available in law libraries and
on judicial and other nonprofit websites. It is possible, although time
consuming, for members of the public to access this IP-free
information without the aid of these proprietary services. As a

232. See supra notes 136–40 and accompanying text.
233. Public accessibility also matters on the copyright side. Works may theoretically be in
the public domain because the copyright term has expired. However, unless extant copies of
these works are publicly accessible, the public domain status of the works is of no practical
significance. The Paul Klee painting that remains in a wealthy person’s study, the movies that
remain in MGM’s vault, and the diary of a famous author stored in her son’s attic are as lost to
the effective public domain as works that were destroyed by fires, natural disasters or wars. See
Reese, supra note 141, at 24–25 (“While copyright might permit anyone to make and distribute
copies of an old unpublished work, no one can engage in those activities without having access
to the work . . . .”).
234. See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 800 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding that copyright protection is unavailable for laws); see also Patterson & Joyce, supra
note 16, at 751–58 (explaining why laws and judicial opinions should not be copyrightprotected).
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practical matter, however, Lexis and Westlaw make public domain
legal information more widely available to the community that relies
on them the most, that is, lawyers, law professors, judges, and their
support staffs. These services are widely used because they add value
to raw public domain information (e.g., by providing search
technologies and remote electronic access so that research can be
done in one’s office or at home without trekking to a library). Access
controls and commercial licensing are strategies for recouping the
expenses of providing these added values. The IP-free status of legal
information is, interestingly enough, an enabler of value-added
products and services.
Equally important as public access to information resources is
the sustainability of that access. Scholars who emphasize the IP-free
definition of public domain may assume that the IP-free status of
information resources will ensure continued public accessibility, but
this is not necessarily so. Charlotte Hess and Professor Elinor
Ostrom, along with Professor Reichman and Dr. Uhlir, focus
235
attention on the sustainability of the information commons.
Sometimes, these authors point out, it is necessary to develop a
complex regulatory structure in order to provide appropriate and
sustainable access to a common pool resource, such as scientific
data.236 This may involve access controls and licensing restrictions that
may seem similar in some respects to those of proprietary services
such as Lexis and Westlaw. A contractually constructed research
commons can, however, be tailored to serve research communities by
providing open access to research data and rights to use the data for
research purposes, while at the same time requiring those who draw
upon the resource to contribute to it. A research commons can
prevent proprietary free riding on the common resource.237

235. Hess & Ostrom, supra note 11, at 112 (“Information that used to be ‘free’ is now
increasingly being privatized, monitored, encrypted, and restricted.”); Reichman & Uhlir, supra
note 92, at 461 (“Our investigation reveals that the policy of open access to public research data
rests on a surprisingly fragile foundation in both the legal and normative sense.”).
236. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 90, at 462 (suggesting that the scientific
community must “ward off the threat of undue enclosure” by “develop[ing] a regulatory
framework to preserve the functions of a research commons”). Professor Benkler is optimistic
that an IP-free commons will be sustainable. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to
Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and User
Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 579 (2000) (noting that the gloomy predictions of IP pundits
are not preordained).
237. Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 92, at 419–60.
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Sustainable access may necessitate more of an institutional
infrastructure than an IP-free public domain alone may permit.
The main risk in accepting multiple public domains is that people
will sometimes be confused about what the term means in particular
238
contexts. A person who believes that open source software is public
domain software might decide to make a proprietary derivative of the
software and then be surprised and dismayed when a lawyer for the
open source software developer threatens to sue for copyright
infringement and breach of the open source license. A person who
believes that certain fair use activities (e.g., place-shifting music) are
public domain might want to start a business selling place-shifting
services to the public, only to encounter the threat of a lawsuit by the
recording industry. Even in the absence of threatened or actual
litigation, confusion about the meaning of public domain in particular
contexts is likely, especially if there are thirteen or more definitions to
keep track of.
No one, of course, is going to be misled into believing that the
register of copyrights is advocating the abolition of copyright law
239
when she speaks of copyright as entering the public domain. In
context, it is possible to discern that she means that members of the
public are actually talking about copyright these days (and not with
the reverence that copyright lawyers and industry executives would
prefer). More generally, discerning the meaning of public domain
from contextual signals such as speaker, type of information resource,
and type of community affected will often be dreary and
unilluminating work. If people mean different things by the same
term, they find it difficult to communicate effectively.
One way to dispel some confusion about the meaning of public
domain in different contexts is to use adjectives to distinguish among
them. This Lecture has done this, for example, by describing public
domain information artifacts or resources as IP-free to distinguish
them from public domains that encompass IP-protected information
resources. This Lecture has also used constitutional or mandatory
public domain to denote information resources that cannot, as a
matter of constitutional law, be privatized. It has identified a
privatizable public domain to denote information resources that are
IP-free for now, but may become IP-encumbered in the future.

238.
239.

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See supra note 22.

02__SAMUELSON.DOC

832

8/21/2006 8:42 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:783

Professors Chander and Sunder similarly use the adjective “romantic”
to signal their differentiated meaning for public domain.
In future work, I expect to continue to recognize these five public
domains (PD 1, 2, 3, 4, and 13) and to distinguish among them with
adjectives. I do not expect to use the term unpublished public domain
(unless marked off with quotation marks to indicate Professor
Reese’s usage) because for me a domain must be public in the sense
of being publicly accessible to be a public domain. Reese’s domain
might more appropriately be called an unpublic domain or a domain
of unpublished works free from copyright restrictions.
When addressed to a general audience, Professor Benkler’s use
of public domain to signify a domain of free uses of information
resources seems sensible. However, in legal discourse, this use of
public domain obscures more than it illuminates various legal status
concepts that I believe legal scholars should try to keep distinct. For
similar reasons, I will not in future work characterize open source or
CC-licensed content as public domain because I regard contractually
constructed commons as a more appropriate moniker for this class of
information resources. Open source and CC-licensed content may, of
course, serve some of the same values as IP-free public domain
resources, but they are significantly encumbered by underlying IP
rights and license terms. As Professor Niva Elkin-Koren has
observed, Creative Commons licenses impose significant costs on
240
users of informational works. She worries about the unintended
consequences for IP-free public domains that will flow from CC’s
“licensing platform[, which] relies heavily on a proprietary system and
on viral contracts.”241 By adopting this licensing platform, Creative
Commons strengthens arguments made by proprietary vendors that
the latters’ viral license terms restricting fair and other socially
valuable uses should be enforced. An IP-free public domain, in
contrast, lowers transactions costs and allows follow-on creators to
use preexisting works far more broadly than CC licenses do.
The public domains that Professors Lange, Cohen, and Birnhack
have articulated are among the most imaginative and inspiring public
242
domains in the literature. From their work, readers should take
away a more dynamic and vibrant sense of the role of public domains

240.
241.
242.

Elkin-Koren, supra note 193, at 3.
Id.
See supra notes 103–29 and accompanying text.
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in creative work and public discourse. Their conceptions of the public
domain give more life and robustness to the public domain of IP-free
information resources (PD 2). All three aim to expand the bounds of
this domain so that appropriations from preexisting works will more
often be deemed legitimate reuse of ideas, rather than an improper
appropriation of expression, from protected works. Professor Lee’s
public domain also aims to enrich this same public domain of IP-free
information resources, albeit in a different way; namely, by
appreciating the significance of disclosure of secret government
information and providing arguments for affirmative rights of the
public in this domain.243
CONCLUSION
Professor Boyle was the first scholar to recognize and celebrate
the existence of multiple public domains.244 In the past five years, even
more public domains have emerged. This Lecture has identified
thirteen public domains, offered reasons why public domains have
proliferated, and suggested some commonalities among them as a
means of facilitating discourse about them.
Accepting the existence of multiple public domains allows
context-sensitive meanings of “public domain” to evolve. It also
contributes to a richer understanding of the contents of public
domains, social values these information resources serve, persons and
communities who care about public domains, the legal and
institutional structures available to preserve them, threats that some
public domains face, and strategies for responding to these threats.
Professor Boyle may be right that scholars initially invented
multiple public domains because of “the implicit fear or concern
about intellectual property that each attempts to alleviate and the
implicit ideal of the information ecology that each attempts to
245
instantiate.” Public domain discourse has, however, taken on a life
of its own, as public domain memes have spread widely via the
Internet. As awareness has spread, public domains have become
more dynamic, vibrant, and even fun than they were twenty years
ago. Public domains will have an even richer and more robust future
if members of the public continue to engage in creative uses of

243.
244.
245.

See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.
Boyle, supra note 3, at 58–62.
Boyle, supra note 2, at 29.
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information technologies via the Internet, implicitly following
Professor Lange’s sage advice to be “at play in the fields of the
246
word.”

246. David Lange, At Play in the Fields of the Word: Copyright and the Construction of
Authorship in the Post-Literate Millennium, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 139 (Spring
1992).

